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The literature concerning the self-conscious emotions is gravitating towards some 
interesting ideas about the dynamics of shame, guilt and empathy.  This thesis 
concerns the development of thinking and empirical research in this area and 
addresses the potential position of the application of these hypotheses to sex 
offenders, and possible implications for their treatment.
Part 1 reviews the literature concerning shame, how it differs from guilt and other 
emotions, and relates specifically to empathy in the general population.  The 
relevance of considering the self-conscious emotions in sex offenders, and the lack of 
empirical research into these emotions in this population is highlighted, as are 
problems in measurement.
Part 2 is the report of an empirical investigation into the prevalence of shame, guilt 
and empathy in sex offenders as compared to non-sex offenders, and the inter­
relationships between these emotions amongst the sample as a whole.  There was 
evidence for one prediction concerning the association of shame with self-oriented 
personal distress in the sample overall and also some unexpected findings, including 
a correlation between guilt and personal distress.  This is an association that has been 
found in a previous study but has not been discussed in depth in the literature, and a 
hypothesis regarding this relationship is offered.  Higher levels of other-oriented 
empathy were found for sex offenders, and the potential role of social desirability in 
this association is discussed.  It was concluded that this study did not allow a fair 
assessment of the self-conscious emotions in sex offenders.
2Part 3 reflects on the process of having carried out this research, and considers 
methodological issues such as self-report technique, the dynamics between the male 
offender participants and the female researcher, and problems with the population 
studied.  Systemic issues are considered in the final section, where variations in 
approach between different forensic settings are explored, as are the impact of these 
on the research process.
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9Abstract
In this paper I will review literature concerning shame and distinguish it from other 
similar emotions such as embarrassment and guilt.  Shame and guilt are emotional 
reactions that often occur in response to transgressions, and concern perceived 
evaluations by others and/or the self.  It has been proposed that shame and guilt have 
very different effects, and that guilt acts as a mediator, whereas shame acts as a 
barrier to the experience of empathy.  Shame and guilt and their relationship to 
empathy will be explored, and key studies demonstrating their inter-relationships will 
be critically evaluated.
The latter part of this review will focus on sex offenders, and will discuss the 
relevance of considering and incorporating an understanding of self-conscious 
emotions in the treatment of sex offenders.  The emerging findings concerning 
shame, guilt and empathy will be explored in light of the fact that empathy training is 
a significant feature of most sex offender treatment programmes.
There is a dearth of research about shame in sex offenders, and its relationship to 
guilt and empathy in this population, although there is much speculation and some 
evidence that shame is prevalent within this population.  If high levels of shame 
hinder the experience of empathy, then for those sex offenders who may be unable 
to, or have great difficulty experiencing empathy due to excessive shame, empathy 
training as part of their treatment might render them a greater risk.  Such training 
might have the effect of teaching individuals who lack empathy to some degree skills
10in acting empathically, but may not necessarily enhance the genuine experience of it. 
Thus, teaching empathy to some sex offenders may have the effect of improving 
their grooming skills as being able to feign empathy might be useful when it comes 
to securing victims.
Attribution theory is outlined and considered in terms of the treatment of sex 
offenders, and the view that guilt but not shame should be encouraged when working 
clinically with sex offenders will be explicated against the backdrop of what is 
currently known about shame and guilt, and their effects on empathy.
11I)  Shame
“How despicably have I acted!” she cried.-“I, who have prided myself on my 
discernment!-1, who have valued myself on my abilities! Who have often disdained 
the generous candour of my sister, and gratified my vanity, in useless or blameable 
distrust.-How humiliating is this discovery!-.... Till this moment, 1 never knew 
myself. ”
Jane Austen (1813)
Shame is an egocentric, self-involved, self-focused experience.  The individual 
immersed in a moment of shame is far more concerned with the implications of their 
transgression for themselves, than for others (Tangney and Dearing, 2002).
Shame is generally viewed as an intense, rather debilitating, negative emotion 
involving feelings of inferiority, powerlessness and self-consciousness (Tangney, 
Miller, Flicker and Barlow, 1996).  It is thought that shame concerns appraisals that 
the self is unable to generate a positive reflection in the eyes of others, and involves 
negative self-appraisals (e.g. Gilbert, 1998).  Shame is considered fundamentally be a 
self-conscious emotion (Tangney and Fischer, 1995).  The experience of shame is 
accompanied by a sense of exposure in front of a real or imagined audience and a 
feeling of being small (Covert, Tangney, Maddux and Heleno, 2003).  Shame is also 
a threat emotion and motivates escape behaviour, concealment, (Tangney, 1995) and
12submissive behaviour (Gilbert, Pehl and Allan, 1994).  Often shame results in actual 
withdrawal from the problematic situation (Covert, et al 2003).
A person experiencing a shame reaction may undergo a sudden affect-shift, such as a 
surge of anger or anxiety (Retzinger, 1991).  They may be crippled by a blank mind, 
and lose confidence and the ability to think and act freely (Lewis, 1986).  It is 
thought that shame has distinctive, submissive facial expressions, and may also 
engender a range of involuntary behaviours and experiences, including blushing, a 
hunched posture, avoidance of eye-contact and changes in speech (Keltner, 1995).
Because of its intense self-focus, shame impairs one’s ability to generate effective 
solutions to interpersonal problems, and also diminishes confidence in one’s ability 
to implement solutions (Self-efficacy) (Covert, etal., 2003).
There has been an abundance of research into shame over the last fifteen years, and 
there is now a consensus that shame can be greatly pathogenic (Tangney and Fischer,
1995).  Research suggests that shame is likely to be an important contributing factor 
to many common problems and psychopathologies, including family problems 
(Fossum & Mason, 1986), interpersonal relationships (Gilbert, Allan & Goss, 1996), 
social anxiety (Gilbert & Trower, 1990), eating disorders (Frank, 1991), depression 
(Andrews, 1995), alcoholism (Bradshaw, 1988), hostility (Retzinger, 1995), suicide 
(Mokros, 1995) and personality disorders (Linehan, 1993).  Therapists may be able 
to enrich their effectiveness with their patients by developing a “third ear” for shame- 
related processes (Tangney and Dearing, 2002).
13The term external shame (Gilbert, 1997) refers to how one perceives that others see 
one (Goss, Gilbert and Allan, 1994).  The way in which external shame is 
experienced is dependent on how important others’ views are to the self.  Hence, the 
experience of external shame is affected by cognitions about the value of others’ 
judgments.  The term internal shame (Gilbert, 1997) concerns the idea of the self 
judging the self (Tarrier, Wells and Haddock, 1998), and pertains to a sense of failing 
to meet internalised standards.
Internal and external shame are not always correlated: For instance, one may feel no 
anxiety about one’s flaws unless one expects that they will be revealed (Lewis,
1992).  Sometimes an individual recognizes that other people consider their 
behaviour shameful, but the person themselves does not (Gilbert, 1998).  For 
example a thief might understand that others disapprove of their behaviour, but have 
no internal shame for it themselves.
Proneness to Shame
Shame-proneness is the tendency to experience shame across a variety of situations 
(Covert et al., 2003).  It is thought that there are individual differences in proneness 
to shame, and in people’s capacity to experience, and also manage and recover from 
shame episodes (Tangney and Dearing, 2002).  Proneness to shame is positively 
related to many significant elements of poor interpersonal and psychological 
adjustment (Covert et al., 2003).
Proneness to shame is likely to be influenced by factors such as early temperament, 
parental and socialization factors, and cultural environment (Tangney and Dearing,
142002).  Research also indicates that shaming interactions between parents and their 
offspring are detrimental to neurological development, including specifically the 
orbital frontal cortex; An area associated with prosocial behaviours (Schore, 1994).
Evidence suggests that people who yield high scores on self-consciousness scales 
also tend to be shame-prone (Darvill, Johnson and Danko, 1992).  When the self is 
the focus of one’s attention, causes of events are likely to be attributed to the self 
(Duval and Wicklund, 1973).  This was supported by studies involving looking at 
one’s reflection in a mirror.
Distinctions Between Shame and Other Similar Emotions
Some of the literature reflects confusion between shame and other similar emotions 
(such as embarrassment and humiliation).  This section will attempt to distinguish 
shame from such emotions.
Shame and Embarrassment
Embarrassment is also a self-conscious emotion, but it is considered milder, more 
specific and light-hearted.  As illuminated by Miller and Tangney (1994), 
embarrassment occurs after relatively trivial accidents.  Conversely shame is a more 
intense feeling following more serious transgressions, that results when one’s deep- 
seated flaws are revealed to oneself and to others.  This was supported by a study 
where participants described experiences of embarrassment and shame and rated 
them according to various dimensions.  Clear differences in the structure and 
phenomenology of these two emotions were observed, that could not be explained 
simply by intensity of affect.  Embarrassment is also distinguished from shame in
15terms of its possible different developmental pathways (Lewis, 1995) and non-verbal 
presentations (Keltner, 1995).
Shame and Social Anxiety
Social anxiety concerns threatening evaluations by others (not the self) (Ohman,
1986).  Socially anxious people are fearful of being shamed (Beck, Emery and 
Greenberg, 1985).  Sympathetic arousal is associated with social anxiety (Miller,
1996), whereas parasympathetic arousal is associated with shame and embarrassment 
(Leary and Kowalski, 1995).  Shame encompasses an established sense of 
inadequacy that continues to exist within the individual, in contrast social anxiety is 
centered around what one may become (Gilbert, 1998).  Social anxiety tends to remit 
upon leaving the situation, unlike shame which is characterised by substantial 
rumination about one’s inferiority and others’ perceptions of it.
Shame and Humiliation
There has been little empirical research in the area of humiliation and its relationship 
to shame, but it has been considered in the context of Gilbert’s (1989) evolutionary 
conceptualization, with humiliation being associated with “fight”, and shame 
associated with “submit” responses (Morrison and Gilbert 2001; Gilbert, 1992). 
Humiliation shares many similarities with shame, such as sensitivity to social put 
down and rumination, but can be distinguished by its emphasis on harm done by 
others (Gilbert, 1998).  It is the psychological scar of what was done to the self by 
another that is felt to be shameful, and the person who caused the harm is blamed and 
viewed as bad.  An internal sense of inferiority is not necessary in humiliation, and 
this emotion is also accompanied by hatred and vengeful feelings.
16Shame and Self-Esteem
Self-esteem has been defined as the extent to which an individual values, approves of 
and likes themselves (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991).  It is thought that there is a 
symbiotic relationship between shame and self-esteem, and both are affected by and 
also affect many other factors, such as scholastic success, quality of relationships, 
cognitive functioning, social skills, physical attractiveness, etc. (Tangney and 
Dearing, 2002).  It has been found that internalized shame is correlated with self­
esteem (Cook, 1991).  Internalized shame has been defined as an “enduring, chronic 
shame that has become internalized as part of one’s identity and which can be most 
succinctly characterized as a deep sense of inferiority, inadequacy or deficiency” 
(Cook, 1988).
It has been suggested that the extent to which shame proneness affects self-esteem 
depends on one’s ability to recover from shame experiences (Tangney and Dearing, 
2002).  For example, a person may have high self-esteem yet still be shame-prone.  A 
minor transgression may engender an acute sense of shame, rendering the person 
feeling worthless and defective momentarily.  These experiences may even be 
regular but will not necessarily tarnish a person’s self-view significantly, because 
they may be very good at recovering from shame experiences (Tangney and Dearing, 
2002).
Tangney and Dearing (2002) hold that the difference between shame and self-esteem 
is that shame-proneness is the tendency to respond to triggering events with shame,
17as opposed to self-esteem, which is a more consistent and stable self-evaluation, 
independent of triggers.
Clearly these two concepts overlap to some degree, and variations in definitions 
create some difficulties in discriminant validity when attempts to measure shame and 
self-esteem are made.  For example, although the Internalized Shame Scale (Cook,
1988)  separates self-esteem within a separate sub-scale, shame as measured by this 
scale (particularly early versions of it) has been found to be highly correlated with 
other measures of self-esteem (e.g. Coopersmith, 1967).
Shame and Narcissism
Narcissism as a disorder of personality is defined in DSM IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) as encompassing a grandiose sense of self-importance, a feeling 
of specialness, a need for admiration, a sense of entitlement, exploitative tendencies, 
arrogance and a lack of empathy, and is regarded as the hallmark of narcissistic 
disorders (Glasser, 1992).
Shame and narcissism share the common experience of the self as central.  Whereas 
shame is a noxious experience of the self, a wave of self-disparagement, narcissism 
is a positive experience of the self, a state of self-love and adoration (Nathanson,
1987).
Another critical common feature of these two phenomena is the propensity to focus 
on the entire self.  As outlined below in the section on Guilt, shame involves an 
intense and global self-focus.  A similar process occurs in narcissism when
18evaluating failure.  Shame is a likely consequence of failure because of this focus on 
the whole self.  Similarly, hubris is a likely outcome of success (Lewis, 1995). 
Narcissism is characterized by unrealistic evaluations of success.  Such grandiose 
evaluation seeks to strengthen hubris and avoid shame, and is characteristic of the 
self-aggrandizing quality central to narcissistic behaviour (Lewis, 1995).
As discussed in the section on Shame and Empathy, shame-prone people tend to 
externalize blame (Tangney, 1991).  This is also a consistent feature of narcissism, 
and stems from the need to defend against failure and hence, shame (Lewis, 1995).
Narcissism is widely recognized as a defence against the hatred of the self in shame 
(Nathanson, 1987).  Some theorists (such as Lewis, 1992) assert that an inability to 
cope with feelings of shame underlies narcissism.  Individuals with a narcissistic 
personality style are likely to be shame-prone and act to avoid experiencing shame. 
Given the drive to avoid shame and the reality that sometimes shame cannot be 
avoided, narcissists have extreme reactions to the shame experience.  A narcissist 
who is shamed is likely to react with intense rage or depression (Lewis, 1992).
Montebarocci, Surcinelli, Baldaro, Trombini and Rossi (2004) highlighted the 
distinction between ‘covert’ narcissists; People who are inhibited and sensitive to 
humiliating experiences, and ‘overt’ narcissists; Exhibitionist, aggressive individuals 
who do not respect the needs of others.  They correlated a measure of narcissism (the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory; Raskin and Terry, 1988) with proneness to shame, 
as measured by the Shame-Guilt Proneness Scale (Battachi, Codispoti and Marano, 
1994) amongst a sample of 165 students.  They found overall that narcissism was
19negatively correlated with both shame and guilt.  Montebarocci et. al. (2004) pointed 
out that the measure of narcissism used in their study measured ‘overt’ narcissism. 
They explained their findings in terms of overt narcissists being immune to feelings 
of guilt due to personality structure, and negating feelings of shame as a defence 
against feelings of inferiority.
The study by Montebarocci et. al. (2004) represents a rare attempt to test empirically 
the assumed relationship between shame and narcissism.  However, it suffers from 
the drawback that there is no concrete evidence that the low shame scores yielded by 
participants in this study were actually a defence against feelings of inferiority. 
Hence, although there is much speculation concerning shame as the hallmark of 
narcissism, particularly in the psychoanalytic literature (e.g. Glasser, 1992), there is 
little empirical evidence for this assertion.
II)  The Difference Between Shame and Guilt
“A good conscience fears no witness, but a guilty conscience is solicitous even in 
solitude. If we do nothing but what is honest, let all the world know it.  But if 
otherwise, what does it signify to have nobody else know it, so long as I know it 
myself? Miserable is he who slights that witness''.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca, 5 BC - 65 AD.
Although the terms shame and guilt have often been used interchangeably (Tangney, 
1991), much research indicates that these emotional experiences are distinct.  As 
defined by Lewis (1971), in guilt, the self negatively evaluates particular behaviours,
20and the focus is usually specific, often relating to behaviours that involve harm to 
another.  Guilt is associated with empathy for the harmed other, and facilitates 
reparative action.  It is uncomfortable but not debilitating.  Conversely in shame, the 
self negatively evaluates the entire self.  This painful, global affective state can 
motivate anger.  Feelings of shame are overwhelming, and involve a pronounced 
self-focus.  Shame takes the point of attention away from the distressed other, and 
draws it back to the self (Tangney, 1991).  Further, evolutionary psychologists 
believe that shame evolved from submissive behaviour, and that guilt evolved from 
altruism (Gilbert, 1989).
Whereas the emphasis of shame is on a failing in the self (“look what I’ve done”), 
guilt is concerned with morally disappointing behaviour (“look what I’ve done”) 
(Salovey, 2002 [cited in Tangney and Dearing, 2002]).
Distinctions between shame and guilt have been empirically tested.  Tangney, 
Marschall, Rosenberg, Barlow, and Wagner (1994 [cited in Tangney and Dearing, 
2002]) found upon asking adults and children about their experiences of shame and 
guilt, that the interpersonal focus varied between these two emotions.  Shame 
experiences were characterized by other people’s evaluations of the self, and guilt 
experiences emphasized one’s effect on others.  Tangney (1993) requested 
descriptions of personal experiences of both guilt and shame from a sample of 65 
adults, and observed that shame experiences were harder to describe, more painful, 
and accompanied by a sense of both exposure and inferiority, in comparison to guilt 
experiences.  Further evidence of the difference in interpersonal focus of these two 
emotions was obtained by Niedenthal, Tangney and Gavanski (1994) in a study
21where participants were asked to imagine the unfolding of events under specific 
circumstances.  It was found that participants were more likely to ‘undo’ aspects of 
the self in shame as compared to guilt experiences, and were more likely to ‘undo’ 
aspects of their behaviour in guilt than they did in shame experiences.
A person’s knowledge of social norms, sensitivity to the dynamics of situations, and 
vigilance to social cues is known as self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974).  A modest link 
between guilt-proneness and self-monitoring has been found (Tangney and Dearing, 
2002), highlighting the relationship between the tendency to monitor one’s behaviour 
and feelings of guilt.  This association was not found for shame and self-monitoring. 
However, these findings are based on just one study, therefore the reliability for this 
idea is questionable.
Attribution Theory
Shame and guilt are inherently related to perceptions of ourselves, and levels of self­
esteem.  They can be discriminated according to Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale’s 
(1978) dimensions of causal attributions (Tangney and Dearing 2002), which 
consider locus of control (internal versus external), globality (global versus specific) 
and stability (stable versus unstable).
In both shame and guilt, internal attributions are made.  Whereas guilt is associated 
with specific and unstable attributions, shame involves global and stable attributions.
For example, a person who gets ‘too’ drunk at someone else’s birthday celebration 
and behaves inappropriately to the point that it spoils the atmosphere, might feel
22guilt.  They may experience a sense of tension and remorse over what they have 
done, focusing on that specific indiscretion.  They know that they are responsible for 
their behaviour (internal attribution), but acknowledge that the causes of this 
misdemeanor are rather specific; They know that they are not generally an 
irresponsible or rude person (specific attribution), and that the antecedents to their 
behaviour were unique to that particular event (unstable attribution).
Conversely, shame involves a focus on the entire self and is likely to be relatively 
persistent.  Often internal, stable and global attributions are made when one 
experiences shame.  Another person in similar circumstances may experience an 
acute sense of shame, feeling disgraced, small and wanting to hide.  With a clear 
self-focus, they also know they are responsible (internal attribution), but may believe 
that the causes of this misdeed are a reflection of their personality -  irritating, loud, 
aggressive (global attribution), and that this type of behaviour occurs within various 
settings (stable attribution).
Ill)  Empathy
“The actor may feel the situation of the person in the part so keenly, and 
respond to it so actively, that he actually puts himself in the place of that person. 
From that point of view he then sees the occurrence through the eyes of the person 
who was slapped.  He wants to act, to participate in the situation, to resent the insult, 
just as though it were a matter of  personal honour with him. ”
Constantin Stanislavski, 1937
23According to Feshbach (1975), empathy is the capacity to share another person’s 
emotional world and requires the cognitive ability to take another person’s 
perspective, to discriminate another person’s specific emotional experience, and the 
affective capacity to engage freely in one’s own range of emotion.  Empathy is 
crucial to the development of trusting and rewarding experiences (Rogers, 1961), and 
is essential to higher social functioning (Rankin, Kramer and Miller, 2005).  It 
promotes altruistic behaviour (Eisenberg, 2000) and suppresses aggression (Saami, 
1999).
Components of empathy begin to emerge by approximately age four, as noted by 
Eisenberg-berg and Neal (1979), who found that pre-schoolers attributed their 
prosocial behaviour to the needs of others.  Empathy is an essential feature of a good 
therapeutic alliance (Rogers, 1975) and a healthy parent-child-relationship 
(Feschbach, 1987).
As noted by Tangney and Dearing (2002), empathy is a good moral experience, 
guiding people in morally good directions, and away from iniquity.  Empathy helps 
us comprehend interpersonal situations, permitting sensitive responsivity to others.
Of most importance however, is the fact that empathy allows us to discern when we 
have behaved towards others in a way that adversely affects them, and also fosters 
remedial action.
Research indicates that empathy is comprised of both cognitive and affective 
elements (Cliffordson, 2002; Davis, 1983; Eslinger, 1998; Grattan and Eslinger,
1989).  Cognitive empathy involves perspective taking and reaching an intellectual
24understanding of another’s cognitive and affective state.  Emotional empathy on the 
contrary, is a sudden powerful feeling of concern for another person in distress.  For 
this type of empathy, the cognitive explanation for the other person’s distress is not 
necessary (Rankin, Kramer and Miller, 2005).  It would seem that the same is true 
the other way around; Psychopaths, for example, have been found to be deficient in 
processing affect such as fear and sadness (Blair, Jones, Clark and Smith, 1997), but 
do not display impairment in Theory of Mind tasks (Richell, Mitchell, Newman, 
Leonard, Baron-Cohen and Blair, 2003).
Empathy and Sympathy
There is a consensus that true empathy also consists of sympathy (Tangney and 
Dearing, 2002).  Sympathy is an affective reaction of concern for another person in 
distress, rather than a vicarious experience of the same emotion, as in empathy 
(Decety and Chaminade, 2003, Eisenberg, 1986).  Hence, sympathy can occur in the 
absence of empathy (Tangney and Dearing, 2002), and it would follow that empathy 
at a cognitive level can occur without sympathy, as in the cases of psychopaths, as 
outlined above.
Empathy, Personal Distress and Shame
When an individual experiences other-oriented empathy, they take the perspective of, 
and vicariously experience similar emotions to another person.  They feel sympathy 
and concern for them, which often engenders extending help.  In this scenario, the 
empathic person maintains a focus on the other person’s needs and experiences 
(Tangney and Dearing, 2002).
25This is in contrast to a self-oriented personal distress response, a subset of empathy 
that, according to Davis (1983), is associated with fear, vulnerability and uncertainty, 
in which there is an emphasis on the emotions and requirements of the empathizer 
and their own empathic response.  Davis (1983) described personal distress as 
“selfish” feelings of discomfort.  It is thought that this response is due to “egoistic 
drift” (Hoffman, 1984).  This is where a self-focused individual begins to feel 
empathy for another, but where the empathic affect diverts to one’s own needs, 
hence, the other-oriented emphasis fades and the empathic response terminates 
(Tangney and Dearing, 2002).  For example, a passer-by witnessing a road traffic 
accident may begin to empathise with the casualty, but soon become aware of and 
focus on his or her own response, which may in this instance include shock, sadness, 
disgust at the sight of gruesome injuries etc.  Hence, attention to the needs of the 
casualty is superceded by the needs of the passer-by.
Davis (1983) hypothesized the existence of strong individual differences in empathy 
that exert a significant influence on emotional reactions.  His Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) is a comprehensive and multidimensional 
measure of empathy that clearly distinguishes personal distress as a discrete 
component of empathy.
The IRI has four subscales: Personal Distress; Perspective Taking; Empathic 
Concern; Fantasy.  Personal Distress and Empathic Concern reflect the emotional 
dimension of empathy, and Fantasy and Perspective Taking assess the cognitive 
aspects of empathy.  Davis (1983) suggested that empathic predispositions affect 
emotional reactions, and demonstrated evidence of the validity of the IRI in several
26studies.  A stable factor structure of the IRI over repeated administrations to different 
samples has been reported (Davis, 1980), as have satisfactory test-retest and internal 
reliabilities (Davis, 1983).  Discriminant validity has been demonstrated in studies 
correlating the relevant subscales with measures of social competence, self-esteem, 
emotionality, sensitivity to others and emotional empathy (Davis, 1983).
Unlike self-oriented personal distress, other-oriented empathy is associated with 
altruistic behaviour (Batson, et al,  1988).  Personal distress has been found to be 
correlated with negative interpersonal behaviours amongst couples in relationships 
(Davis and Oathout, 1987), and also impedes prosocial behaviours (Estrada, 1995).
IV)  Shame, Guilt and Empathy
Guilt and empathy are considered “moral” emotions, helping people to keep their 
behaviour in check.  Empathy obstructs or prevents misdemeanours, and guilt fosters 
expiation and reparative action.  It has been proposed that guilt and empathy work 
together to avoid and repair transgressions, and that shame impedes other-oriented 
empathic connection (Tangney and Dearing, 2002). The fixation with the self that 
occurs in shame is incongruous with the other-oriented nature of empathy.
There is evidence for a positive association between guilt and empathy, and a 
negative association between shame and empathy.  For example, when children and 
adults described guilt episodes, they expressed more empathy for others compared to 
when they described shame episodes (Tangney, et al, 1994 [cited in Tangney and 
Dearing, 2002]).  However, shame has been found to correlate with the ‘selfish’ 
aspect of empathy; Self-oriented personal distress.  Tangney and Dearing (2002) 
assert that shame-prone people are more likely to experience an egoistic drift when
27confronted with another individual’s distress, in that they have a greater propensity to 
be distracted by their own emotional needs, rather than engaging with the other 
person’s feelings.
Tangney (1991) investigated these relationships using self-report methods in four 
independent studies of American undergraduates, who received course credits for 
their participation.
In the first study, 101 participants completed the Self Conscious Affect and 
Attribution Inventory (SCAAI: Tangney, Burggraf, Hamme and Domigos, 1988 
[cited in Tangney and Dearing, 2002]); a scenario-based scale that measures, 
amongst other variables, shame and guilt.  Empathy was measured using Feshbach 
and Lipian’s (1987) Empathy Scale for Adults (ESA; As cited in Tangney and 
Dearing, 2002).  This measure yields four empathy subscales (General Empathy; 
Cognitive Empathy; Emotional Responsiveness; Affect Cue Discrimination) and a 
combined Total Empathy Index.  It was found that shame was significantly 
negatively correlated with two Empathy subscales (Affective Cue Discrimination; 
Cognitive Empathy) and the Total Empathy Index.  There was a negative correlation 
for shame and Emotional Responsiveness, but this was not significant.  There was no 
correlation between shame and General Empathy.  A positive correlation was found 
between guilt and the Total Empathy Index as well as General and Cognitive 
Empathy, but guilt was not significantly associated with Emotional Responsiveness 
or Affective Cue Discrimination.  This study found a significant negative 
relationship between shame and some aspects of empathy, and a significant positive 
association between guilt and some aspects of empathy.
28In Tangey’s (1991) second study comprising 97 undergraduates, shame was found to 
be significantly negatively correlated with all aspects of empathy measured by the 
ESA, except for General Empathy, lending support to the hypothesis that shame and 
empathy have a negative relationship.
In the third study shame was found to be significantly positively correlated with 
general empathy.  This appears to be counter evidence for the hypothesis under 
enquiry.  However it was interpreted in terms of the General Empathy subscale of the 
ESA combining other-oriented empathy items with self-oriented personal distress 
items.  This would fit with the hypothesis that shame and personal distress are 
positively associated.  It is curious, however, that the effects of the self-oriented 
personal distress items within the General Empathy subscale did not exert such an 
influence in the other studies.  Tangney (1991) offered the explanation that the 
personal distress items attenuated an otherwise inverse relationship between shame 
and other-oriented empathy in the studies that found this association, and superseded 
this relationship in the third study.  This is an interesting speculation but not an 
empirical finding.
In the third study, there were no other significant correlations, and not all the 
correlations were negative.  This study did not support the hypothesis that shame and 
empathy are inversely related.  Guilt, however, was found to be significantly 
positively correlated with all aspects of empathy measured by the ESA, other than 
Affective Empathy, providing good evidence for the hypothesized relationship 
between guilt and empathy.
29The fourth of Tangney’s (1991) studies measured guilt and shame using the SCAAI, 
and measured empathy using Davis’s (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). 
There is no general measure of empathy within the IRI, and all personal distress 
items are confined to the Personal Distress subscale.  Implementing this measure of 
empathy within Tangney’s (1991) fourth study appears to have been a good potential 
practical solution to the problem of personal distress confounding the ESA.
In Tangney’s fourth (1991) study all four scales of the IRI were significantly 
positively correlated with guilt as measured by the SCAAI.  Whilst this finding lends 
strong support for the proposed relationship between empathy and guilt, the 
significant positive association between personal distress and guilt is inconsistent 
with the theory concerning shame, guilt and empathy.  With guilt being associated 
with helping and altruism, it is perhaps unexpected that this self-oriented aspect of 
empathy would correlate with it.  This apparently paradoxical finding is not 
specifically addressed in Tangney’s (1991) paper.  One possibility is that in response 
to another individual’s distress, one may experience personal distress and then an 
egoistic drift as suggested by Tangney and Dearing (2002), but one’s attention may 
drift back to the individual in distress.  Hence, egoistic drift within personal distress 
might be a transient experience that can culminate in either shame or guilt.
The Personal Distress subscale of the IRI was significantly positively correlated with 
shame.  This relationship is consistent with both the self-oriented nature of personal 
distress and also that of shame.  Unexpectedly, there was a significant positive 
relationship between shame and Empathic Concern.  This finding is incongruous
30with the proposed negative relationship between shame and empathy, and is also not 
addressed in the original research.  It is possible that this inconsistency was simply 
due to random error, or maybe that the hypothesis concerning the inverse relationship 
between shame and empathy is not a reliable association, and is dependent on the 
measures being used.  Although there is reasonable evidence for the inverse 
relationship between shame and empathy when empathy is measured using the ESA, 
there is no evidence for this relationship when the IRI is used to measure empathy.
No significant correlations were found between shame and Fantasy or shame and 
Perspective Taking.  Overall, this study supported the hypothesis that both guilt and 
shame and also that shame and personal distress are positively correlated, but did not 
lend support to the suggested negative relationship between shame and empathy.
For all four studies, Tangney (1991) further refined the analyses and performed part 
correlations factoring out shame from guilt and guilt from shame.  It was found that 
shame residuals were negatively correlated with all aspects of empathy as measured 
by the ESA, the only exception being General Empathy and Shame in study 2.  There 
were no significant correlations between Shame and General Empathy overall, 
between Cognitive Empathy and Shame in Study 3, or between Emotional 
Responsiveness and Shame in Study 1.  However, the remaining ten correlations 
between the various measures of shame and empathy as measured by the ESA across 
these four studies were significant, giving some support to the contention that shame 
and empathy are inversely related.
Partial correlational analyses of shame and guilt with Davis’s (1983) empathy 
subscales revealed that Personal Distress was significantly positively associated with
31shame residuals, and this was understood in terms of the self-oriented nature of both 
these variables.  However, even with such statistical refinement, neither Fantasy nor 
Empathic Concern were found to be significantly negatively associated with shame. 
Perspective Taking was significantly negatively correlated with shame residuals, 
fitting with the suggested relationship between shame and empathy, and this was also 
significantly positively correlated with guilt.  Tangney (1991) highlighted Davis’s 
(1983) view that perspective taking is the quintessential aspect of mature adult 
empathy, strengthening the idea that guilt and empathy are related.  Part correlations 
confirmed the significant positive relationship already observed between guilt and 
the expected IRI subscales, based on the original results.
Overall, Tangney’s research provides some evidence for the proposed link between 
empathy and guilt, and the negative association between shame and empathy.  It 
raises questions however, about whether the inverse association between shame and 
empathy is a function of the measure of empathy used.  A difficulty with the first 
three studies is also that personal distress items within the general empathy measure 
may have clouded the picture somewhat.
With regards to the measure of shame and guilt used in Tangney’s (1991) research, 
the SCAAI is a scenario-based measure.  Tangney and Dearing (2002) cite as an 
advantage that such instruments inquire about specific reactions in particular 
contexts, allowing the measurement of the emotional reaction per se, as opposed to 
general feelings about the self.  However, this also means that not all situations will 
be considered, resulting in an assessment of emotional reactions in particular 
contexts that may not reflect one’s general tendency to respond.  Further limitations,
32as pointed out by Tangney and Dearing (2002), include that the SCAAI has weak 
internal consistency relative to other shame measures, and has been found to 
correlate with moral standards (Kugler and Jones, 1992), suggesting that it may be 
tapping values and standards, rather than the emotion guilt itself.  On balance, 
Tangney and Dearing (2002) highlight that some degree of moral judgment is likely 
to be involved in the affective experience of guilt.
In Tangney’s (1991) research discussed above, samples consisted of students.  Her 
findings are therefore difficult to generalize to other populations as students might be 
considered a more intelligent than average sample.  Importantly, they were 
psychology students earning course credits by participating in the research, perhaps 
suggesting that they were a relatively more self-aware group.
Other support for the hypothesis that shame inhibits empathy and that empathy is 
associated with guilt comes from a study where undergraduates described recent 
intense interpersonal conflict, from both their own, and their partner’s perspectives 
(Leith and Baumeister, 1998).  People whose descriptions were coloured by guilt 
were better able to shift perspectives than others.  Findings for shame were less 
consistent, but when significant, shame experiences were associated with impaired 
perspective taking (Tangney and Dearing, 2002).
Tangney and Dearing (2002) assert that guilt catalyses other-oriented empathy.  The 
person in the midst of a guilt reaction centers on the transgression.  Focusing on the 
specific behaviour enables them to be free of the egocentricism that characterizes 
shame, and illuminates the repercussions of that behaviour for others (Tangney and
33Dearing, 2002).  There is a growing body of research amongst children, adolescents, 
undergraduates and adults supporting, to some degree, the suggestion that individual 
differences in proneness to shame are inversely related to a dispositional capacity for 
empathy, and that guilt-proneness is associated with empathy (Tangney and Dearing, 
2002).  However, findings are not especially consistent, particularly with regards to 
shame and empathy.
Theories Concerning Shame and Empathy
According to Roys (1997), shame hampers the possibility of empathic connection 
because shame impairs one’s ability to experience a normal range of emotions.  As 
has already been outlined, shame is a sense of not being acceptable.  It is suggested 
by Roys (1997) that some people, depending on their experiences, can become stifled 
by shame.  Such a focus on one’s own sense of shame dampens the ability to 
experience one’s other emotions, and therefore the capacity to share another’s 
emotional experience.  Further emotional exploration is halted following deployment 
(Moses-Hrushovski, 1994) of defence mechanisms, as triggered by the shame 
experience.  In sum, shame may also inhibit empathy by way of restricting one’s 
emotional repertoire.
The research by Tangney (1991) suggests that shame and guilt are distinct affective 
experiences.  Her results supported the notion of a link between guilt and empathy, 
possibly due to empathic people being more likely to notice when they have caused 
another harm, and/or because the tendency to respond with guilt may facilitate an 
empathic connection with others.  Additionally, it was postulated that both empathy 
and guilt stem from a more general level of psychological differentiation.  Empathy
34requires the capacity to differentiate between self and other, and guilt requires 
distinguishing between self and behaviour.
Tangney (1991) suggested that shame-proneness may be inversely related to 
empathic responsiveness because the shame-prone individual lacks the capacity for 
differentiation.  In the experience of shame there is no clear distinction between self 
and behaviour.  Specific behaviour may initially be negatively evaluated, but the 
adversity of the behaviour soon becomes generalized to the entire self.  This global 
style may be mirrored in a blurring of the boundaries between self and behaviour, 
and also between self and others (Tangney, 1991).  This may be more pronounced in 
moments of high affect, such as when confronted with a distressed other.  Such 
situations may make it harder for the shame-prone individual to sustain a response 
involving other-oriented empathy, with a more self-oriented distress reaction being 
likely.
This seems highly pertinent to the area of sexual offending.  Shame-prone sex 
offenders, confronted with their distressed victims, may, further to egoistic drift, 
experience personal distress, and bypass the opportunity of experiencing other- 
oriented empathy.  It would appear that an important aspect of their treatment, 
therefore, might be to develop self-monitoring skills as a stepping stone to the 
development of empathy for others, which might show promise of alerting the 
perpetrator to the fact that they are attending mostly to their own negative 
experience, which could be used as a warning sign that they are not attending to 
someone else’s.  Awareness of the experience of others might only be possible 
further to acknowledgement of, rather than immersion in, one’s own.  It would
35appear then, that screening for shame-proneness amongst sex-offenders might be 
beneficial and relevant in planning treatment for sex offenders.
Studies have shown that both adults and children who are shame-prone tend to 
externalise blame (Tangney, 1990; Burggraf, 1989 [cited in Tangney, 1991]).  Such 
extemalisation has been conceptualised as a defence against the painful experience of 
shame (Tangney, 1991).  Whilst it is likely that this process provides short-term 
relief of shame, it is equally plausible that it impedes any possible empathic 
exchange (Tangney, 1991).
Marschall (1996 [cited in Tangney and Dearing, 2002]) induced feelings of shame in 
participants, and found that those who were not shame-prone were more likely to 
experience diminished empathy for a disabled person in a task subsequent to the 
shame induction.  Hence, the shame-induction rendered low-shame-prone individuals 
relatively unempathic (Tangney and Dearing, 2002).
Thus, it seems that shame inhibits empathy for others by way of an excessive 
negative self-focus, by restricting the range of emotion experienced, and also by 
stimulating blaming of others and hostility towards the self and others (Proeve and 
Howells, 2002).
The Measurement of Shame, Guilt and Empathy
Shame, guilt and empathy have mostly been measured using self-report instruments, 
having the benefits of acquiring information directly from the respondent, but also 
the downfall of being susceptible to social desirability effects.  Measures for these
36emotions have taken the forms of straight questionnaires such as the IRI, or scenario- 
based tools, such as the SCAAI.  These instruments are limited by the definitions of 
their authors.  Definitions have changed over the years, and measurements have 
evolved to reflect these changing understandings.  One difficulty in the research of 
shame and guilt is that these two emotions are often combined in measures.  For 
example, one of the three subscales within the Revised Gudjonsson Blame 
Attribution Inventory (Gudjonsson and Singh, 1989) measures guilt, but includes 
items such as “I feel very ashamed of the crime I committed”, which appears to 
relate to shame.
Many of the instruments fall within the categories of state or trait measures.  State- 
based measures assess the respondent’s current emotional state, and trait-based 
measures determine a person’s more stable tendencies to respond in a particular 
manner.  The research investigating the relationship between shame, guilt and 
empathy generally concerns proneness to experiencing these emotions.
V)  Sex Offenders
In this section I will give examples of different types of sexual offending and discuss 
the prevalence of varying sexual offences so that the reader will be able to consider 
the data on self-conscious emotions and sex offenders in context.  Sub-groups of 
offenders will be exemplified, emotions in sex offenders will be explored and 
treatment programmes will be discussed.
37Sexual Offending
Sexual offending usually begins in adolescence (Butler and Seto, 2002), and is 
commonly considered sexual behaviour that victimises others as they do not, or are 
unable to, consent to the behaviour.  These can include contact and non-contact 
offences (Towl and Crighton, 1996).  Sex offenders can be defined legally by at least 
one of the following factors: Age difference between victim and offender; Use of 
force; Violation of kinship or close relationships (Towl and Crighton, 1996).
The most deviant sexual interests are more prevalent among sex offenders who have 
more than one victim, male victims, much younger or much older victims, and 
perpetrators who victimize strangers and use force (Barbaree and Marshall, 1989).
The Scale of the Problem
The Sexual Offences Act (2003) details numerous sexual acts including rape, assault 
and child sex offences as illegal.  Sexual offences come under the category of violent 
crimes, and there has been a steady increase in rates of recorded sexual offences 
since 1983 (Towl and Crighton, 1996).  In 2003-2004 there were 52,070 recorded 
sex offences: 26,709 were indecent assaults on a female; 1,942 were offences of 
gross indecency with a child.  There were 13,247 rapes and 93% of victims were 
female.  Recorded sexual offences increased by 7% in 2003-2004 (Dodd, Nicholas, 
Povey and Walker, 2004).
It is likely that reported figures for sexual offences are serious underestimates of 
actual levels of offending (Dodd et ah,2004) as indicated by the substantial number 
of rapes and indecent assaults that are not reported to the police (Clark, 1993 [as
38cited in Clark and Stephenson, 1993]) and the number of reports that do not result in 
convictions (Towl and Crighton, 1996).
Evidently, sexual offending is a very serious problem in society.  Given the tendency 
for sex offenders to be repeat offenders, it is a matter of urgency that effective 
treatments are developed that bring an end to this destructive behaviour that creates 
such tragic consequences.  It seems imperative that, rather than only provide sex 
offenders with tools for refraining from offending, treatment should transcend this 
relatively superficial level and address the deeper, inner negative emotions of sex 
offenders in addition, which might be significant factors in their offending.
Sex Offenders who Victimise Adults
The heterogeneity present in sexually assaultive behaviour has resulted in conceptual 
and nosological problems.  Sexual aggression can range from minor instances of 
verbal communication and gestures to violent sexual attacks culminating in the death 
of the victim (Polascheck, Ward and Hudson, 1997).  Some theorists (e.g. 
Polascheck, Ward and Hudson, 1997) include serious sexual assaults in their 
classifications of rape, for convenience.
There have been several typologies of rapists, including that of Groth (1979), who 
proposed a motivational typology, with some rapes being sadistic, others anger- 
motivated, and others motivated by power.  There is some evidence that rapists differ 
from non-offending males in their lack of inhibition of arousal by portrayals of 
violent sexual behaviours (Abel, Becker, Blanchard and Flanagan, 1981), and other 
evidence that this difference is not clear cut (Darke, 1990).
39Alternative taxonomies include The Massachusetts Treatment Centre Rapist 
Typology (Version 3, cited in Knight, Warren, Reboussin & Soley, 1998), an 
empirically-validated rapist classification system that is widely used (e.g. Brown and 
Forth, 1997).  Types 1  and 2 are opportunistic, controlled by situational factors, such 
as potential victims being present during another antisocial act, e.g. burglary.  These 
two types differ in terms of social competence, with Type 1  rapists being more 
skilled.  Type 3 rapists are pervasively angry, and their anger is global, infiltrating all 
aspects of their lives.  Types 4, 5, 6 and 7 are sexually motivated, distinguishable in 
terms of aggressiveness, fantasy, and power-reassurance, with the latter two further 
sub-divided according to social competence.  The final motivation (types 8 and 9) is 
characterised by misogynistic anger, and is also distinguishable in terms of achieved 
social competence (Knight, Warren, Reboussin and Soley, 1998).  An interesting 
area of research amongst rapists might be to explore whether and to what extent 
rapists within this classification system are shame-prone.  One might speculate that 
the less socially competent, more angry, power-motivated sex-offenders within this 
typology might have higher levels of dispositional shame.  Treatment for such 
individuals may need to focus on addressing their experiences of personal distress in 
response to others in distress, to begin the process of allowing their attention to shift 
from an egoistic self-focus to a consideration of others.
There is evidence contrary to the view that rape is a consequence of a lack of access 
to consenting partners (Groth and Burgess, 1977), and also to the view that it is due 
to distinguishing social skills deficits (Stermac and Quinsy, 1986).  Whilst some 
research findings support the idea of characteristic attitudes (‘rape myths’, such as
40‘all women secretly want to be raped’), these beliefs are also found amongst men 
who have not been convicted of sexually aggressive offences (Koss, Leonard, 
Beezley and Oros, 1985).
Child Sex Offenders
Perpetrators of childhood sexual abuse are most commonly male adolescents or 
adults known to the child.  Often they are members of the same household (Romans, 
Martin, Anderson, O’Shea and Mullen, 1996).
As noted by Hilton (1993), research suggests that previous childhood sexual abuse is 
more prevalent amongst male paedophiles (28%) than in the general population of 
males (Hanson and Slater, 1988) but no more common than in other psychiatric or 
forensic samples (Jacobson, 1989; Hanson and Slater, 1988).  However, within the 
population of sex offenders generally, there is a higher prevalence of previous sexual 
abuse amongst child molesters (Freund and Kuban, 1993).
A repertory grid study carried out at Broadmoor Hospital found that child molesters 
and incest offenders viewed adult relationships in terms of dominance and 
submission, and also found adults overbearing (Howells, 1979).  This adds to the 
evidence that child molesters do not feel sufficiently socially confident to establish 
adult relationships (Towl and Crighton, 1996), and also raises the possibility that 
these offenders might have high levels of shame, finding it easier to approach and 
interact with children, rather than adults.  According to Freund, McKnight, Langevin 
and Cibiri (1972 [as cited in Cook and Wilson, 1979]), the child victim becomes a
41surrogate for the adult female who is the preferred sexual partner, but who is 
inaccessible due to the social insecurities of the child molester.
Incest Offenders
Although the hypothesis that incest is transferred across generations has in the past 
been popular, it is not well-rooted in the evidence base (Towl and Crighton, 1996), 
with rates of victimisation of incest offenders being on average 20% (Baker, 1985 [as 
cited in Towl and Crighton, 1996]).  This figure is not significantly higher than levels 
of previous victimisation reported in community studies (Williams and Finkelhor, 
1990).  Incest offenders have been found to be older and have poorer socio- 
educational status than offenders against non-relative minors (Curtin and Niveau, 
1998).  They have also been found to have less psychopathology than rapists 
(Firestone, Bradford, Greenberg and Serran, 2000).
Risk Factors During Childhood
Males who were victims of childhood sexual abuse (Langstrom, Grann and Lindblad,
2000), and who experienced material neglect, lack of supervision, and abuse by a 
female (Salter et al., 2003) have been found to be at increased risk of sexual 
offending.  Men who were sexually abused as children are significantly more likely 
to become victimizers than women who were abused (e.g. Glasser et al. 2001).  This 
has been explained in terms of male survivors directing their reactions externally, in 
contrast to female survivors who have tendencies to internalize their feelings and 
express them through self-destruction (Carmen, Rieker and Mills, 1984).  In 
reflecting on this type of evidence, Gilbert’s (1997) hypothesized distinction between 
internal and external shame may be helpful.  An interesting study might be to explore
42differences in shame levels between male and female survivors of childhood sexual 
abuse.  It may be the case that men are more likely to experience external shame, and 
that for women, internal shame is more probable.  Male sex offenders who were 
sexually abused as children might be abusing others because of their grave concern 
with the evaluation of others, and therefore project their anger at being evaluated via 
sexual aggression to those potentially evaluating others.  This is consistent with ideas 
about male sexual offenders being insecure about their masculinity (see section on 
Shame, Guilt and Empathy in Sex Offenders).  Perhaps females, with their 
tendencies to turn their anger inward, might react emotionally to their abuse with a 
stronger experience of internal shame.  This idea could be tested by assessing and 
comparing men and women who were sexually victimized as children on measures 
of external and internal shame.
It is postulated that male survivors are left confused and anxious with regards to 
sexual identity, and make inappropriate attempts to assert their masculinity (Watkins 
and Bentovim, 1992; Glasser et al 2001).  Other risk factors include emotional 
rejection (Craissati, McClurg, Browne, 2002), and experiencing and witnessing 
intrafamilial violence (Salter et. al, 2003).  Marshall and Barbaree (1990) highlight 
examples of poor socialization experiences such as violent parenting, as being the 
cause of powerful feelings of hostility and resentment, and significant precursors to 
sexual offending.  Ward, Hudson, Marshall and Siegert (1995) put forward an 
attachment model of intimacy deficits, proposing that problematic parent-child 
relationships engender various insecure attachment styles amongst sex offenders.  It 
would be beyond the scope of this review to explore the myriad of negative 
experiences that are thought to be precursors to shame.  However it is likely that a
43deep sense of shame would evolve in individuals subjected to such experiences as 
those described above.
Child Pornography and the Internet
Possession of and various forms of involvement with indecent photographs is an 
offence under the Protection of Children Act (1978).  Due to the potent and generally 
collective societal condemnation of paedophiles, one might expect that external 
shame levels would be relatively high in this population.  Obtaining child 
pornography was difficult in the past.  The person would need to present themselves 
physically to a specialised sex shop, or provide personal details to a mail order 
organisation (Towl and Crighton, 1996).  However, now the availability and quantity 
of child pornography is greater than it ever was before because of the internet; A 
medium that allows quick, nameless and faceless dissemination of child pornography 
around the world, and much of the internet-related child pornography is free (Taylor 
and Quayle, 2004).
Clearly technology development means that child pornography is not only readily 
available, but costs may be far less substantial, both financially and emotionally.  A 
shame-prone person with a sexual interest in children and a high level of external 
shame might never have provided personal details or shown their face in a quest to 
acquire child pornography because of their avoidance of shame.  However, a shame- 
prone person no longer needs to experience external shame to that degree when 
obtaining child pornography, as this is now a simple, quick, and most importantly, 
private experience.  On balance, of course there is nothing good about child 
pornography being available on the internet, however, the ease and privacy with
44which it can now be obtained might mean that less negative affect is experienced by 
potential perpetrators due to less external shame feelings when obtaining child 
pornography.  Ultimately, this might mean less offending for that individual, but 
probably more offending from others, due to the need to create new material, and 
hence, new victims.
As noted by Towl and Crighton (1996), it is impossible to control the existence and 
volume of this type of pornography, and once a child’s image enters and is 
distributed around the internet, its digital echo could be infinite.  Unfortunately, this 
may also mean that some victims of child abuse, such as those who have been 
photographed or filmed, may consequently find it even harder to shed their shame, 
with the knowledge that images of them in positions that are likely to evoke a deep 
sense of shame might be circulated on the web and never destroyed, giving them an 
ever-present and infinite quality.  Hence, we could be confronting a whole new 
dimension of indelible shame amongst victims of childhood sexual abuse, in this 
current age of technological growth.  In view of the fact that a risk factor for 
becoming a perpetrator is having been a victim, the experience of shame, in response 
to an awareness of oneself in ‘shameful’ poses on the internet, might exacerbate the 
shame problem in those victims of childhood sexual abuse whose images were at one 
point circulated through the world wide web, and who then become perpetrators 
themselves.
VI)  Shame in Sex Offenders
It has been proposed that levels of shame amongst sex offenders are high, due to the 
perceived disapproval of sexual offending amongst the general majority (Scheff and 
Retzinger, 1997).  Scheff and Retzinger (1997) also postulate that sex offenders
45harbour deep insecurities regarding their masculinity, and cite as evidence for this 
studies demonstrating either low or high self-esteem amongst rapists (Marshall and 
Marshall, 1981 [as cited in Scheff and Retzinger, 1997]; Marshall and Turner, 1985 
[as cited in Scheff and Retzinger, 1997]; Lawson et al.  1979).  In Lawson etaVs 
(1979) study, corroboration of offenders’ self-esteem levels was acquired by 
assessing prison staffs evaluations of those offenders, using the same scale.  It was 
observed that those offenders who presented as being high on self-esteem were, 
according to the opinions of prison staff, in fact low on self-esteem.  This research 
was understood in terms of a reaction formation, whereby sex offenders with very 
low self-esteem compensated for this with a false and increased bravado attitude that 
reflected hyperidentification with the traditional male role (Lawson et al.  1979).  It is 
the opinion of Scheff and Retzinger (1997) that self-esteem is largely based on 
shame and pride, and that instruments that measure self-esteem do not discriminate 
between genuine pride and exaggerated, false self-confidence.  Hence, they propose 
that unacknowledged shame drives the exaggerated masculinity and aggressiveness 
that characterizes some sex offenders.
Scheff and Retzinger (1997) present some interesting ideas, and it would appear 
logical that the incarcerated sex offending population might be replete with shame. 
Sex offenders are not only condemned by society as a whole, but also within the 
prison environment, as evident by the fact that many sex offenders in most prisons 
reside in a segregated unit, where they are protected from the hostility of non-sex 
offenders.  However, there is little empirical evidence for this assertion that shame is 
prevalent amongst sex offenders, and the research of Lawson et al. (1979) suffers 
from significant limitations.
46A difficulty with the research by Lawson et al. (1979) is that the opinions of prison 
staff would have been highly subjective and not necessarily a reflection of the 
offender’s true character.  Their opinions might have been coloured by the dynamics 
of the relationships between the staff member and inmate, and by the staff member’s 
preconceptions and attitudes towards sex offenders.  It is possible that offenders who 
yielded high scores on self-esteem really did have high self-esteem and low shame, 
and that the results were misinterpreted.  Psychodynamic processes involving 
defence mechanisms such as reaction formation are almost impossible to test validly 
and reliably, as they exist within a relatively speculative context, creating great 
problems in measurement.  Further, this research investigated only rapists, therefore 
cannot be generalized to the sex offending population at large.
Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson (1994) detected significantly higher shame amongst sex 
offenders in their study investigating the reasons why offenders confess to the police. 
This is a start to addressing the question of whether shame is especially prevalent in 
sex offenders, but there appear to be difficulties with validity of this research.  The 
measure used in this study was the Confession Questionnaire (Gudjonsson and 
Petursson, 1991).  This instrument does not assess shame, but Sigurdsson and 
Gudjonsson (1994) added in the question “Did you find it difficult to confess because 
you felt ashamed of your offence?” to the measure, especially for this study. 
Significantly greater endorsement of this item amongst sex offenders compared to 
other offenders was accepted as there being a relative abundance of shame amongst 
sex offenders (Gudjonsson, 2006).  However, making this assumption on the basis of 
one question that directly asked the offender if they were ashamed about their
47offence raises several issues.  First of all, only one question was asked, and 
presumably, expressing shame within a single question is not likely to be a valid 
measurement of an emotion so multi-faceted and complex.  Secondly, the question 
relates to specific behaviour rather than a global evaluation of the self, which, 
according to the literature reviewed, relates more to guilt than shame.  Hence, this 
study suffers from the fairly common problem of confounding shame and guilt. 
Further, supplying the word “ashamed” with no explanation of the corresponding 
emotional experience is not likely to be a valid technique for assessing shame 
because of the subjectivity of individual definitions.
This was an interesting study with useful findings.  It has been cited as evidence for 
raised levels of shame in sex offenders (e.g. Gudjonsson, 2006), but upon 
considering how shame was operationalised and measured in this study, and the 
subsequent weak validity, this finding cannot be taken as empirical evidence of the 
existence of relatively higher levels of shame amongst sex offenders.  In addition, 
adding a question to a measure that was not present in the original instrument 
obviously means that it cannot be norm-referenced.
In a comprehensive study, Wright (2005) investigated, amongst other variables, the 
interrelationships between shame, guilt and empathy.  She researched a sample of 
convicted offenders, but she did not separate sex offenders as a group (who only 
comprised 10% of the sample), therefore this study did not discriminate the dynamics 
of self-conscious emotions in sex offenders from those of non-sex offenders.
Wright’s (2005) findings included that shame and guilt were distinct emotions and
48that shame was correlated with personal distress, but the positive association of guilt 
and empathy was not observed.
VII)  Issues Pertaining to the Treatment of Sexual Offenders
Bumby, Marshall and Langton (1999) proposed a theoretical conceptualisation 
within which to consider the distinct negative affective experiences of shame and 
guilt in the context of sexually offending behaviour.  Following a sexual offence, an 
attribution is made by the offender to explain their behaviour.  When the offender 
makes an internal, global and stable attribution subsequent to having committed a 
sexual offence, the resulting affective experience is shame.  This is likely to be 
associated with lower levels of self-efficacy, less adaptive coping, increased 
cognitive distortions, personal distress, extemalisation of blame, and decreased 
victim-specific empathy.  All of these effects make re-offending more likely.
Bumby, Levine and Cunningham (1996, as cited in Schwartz, 1999) found a 
significant positive association between shame-proneness, personal distress, self- 
consciousness and extemalization, amongst a small sample of sexual offenders in 
outpatient treatment.  They also found that those who were prone to guilt had higher 
levels of empathic concern and perspective taking ability.  This is very much in line 
with the theory put forward by Tangney and Dearing (2002).  At face value, this 
study appears to indicate that some of the observed inter-relationships between 
shame, guilt and empathy illuminated by Tangney and Dearing (1991) may also exist 
amongst sex offenders.  However, the details of this study, such as the exact 
measures that were used, the methods employed and the sample tested, are 
unavailable as the paper was presented at a conference but was never published.
49Much importance is placed on the idea of empathy as being deficient in sex 
offenders.  Hence, many treatment programs comprise empathy training (Roys,
1997).  However, Hilton (1993) challenged the practice of empathy training in child 
molesters, raising concern that such treatment programs may merely be teaching 
offenders to feign and speak the language of empathy, but not to have a genuine 
understanding of it.  Roys (1997) warns that there is an insufficient appreciation of 
how empathy works and can be developed or repaired, and what offenders are being 
asked to do when they are told they must develop empathy is unclear.
Research on empathy in sex offenders presents a rather mixed picture, with some 
studies indicating lower levels of general empathy in sex offenders compared to non­
sex offenders (e.g. Rice, Chaplain, Harris and Coutts, 1994), and other studies having 
found no differences (e.g. Langevin, Wright and Handy, 1988), and more recent 
studies broadly suggesting that sex offenders experience empathy in the same way 
that other people do in general, but that their empathy deficits are located specifically 
with regards to their own victims (e.g. Fernandez, Marshall, Lightbody and 
O’Sullivan, 1999; Fernandez and Marshall [as cited in Marshall, Hamilton and 
Fernandez, 2000]; Marshall, Champagne, Brown and Miller, 1997).  As has been 
discussed above, there are some clear clinical implications regarding shame, guilt 
and empathy in sex offenders.  Investigating self-conscious emotions, it appears, 
might be an illuminating area of research both at the level of scientific enquiry, and 
clinical formulation and treatment.
50Much treatment for sex offenders is group-based.  However, high levels of external 
shame may act as a deterrent to a sex offender genuinely engaging with such a social 
process, as this might mean being overwhelmed with the painful shame experience. 
On the contrary, as explained by Gilbert (1997), the amount of importance placed on 
the value of the opinions of others would affect the shame reaction, so it would be 
expected that sex offenders’ beliefs about the value of judgments of other sex 
offenders (and staff) might be important to consider in group therapy.  As found by 
Houston (1998), some offenders acknowledge the sexual nature of their behaviour, 
but their very tight construing of sexual offenders refers to rigid categories that they 
do not believe they fit into, such as ‘strangers who abduct children’ (Houston, 1998). 
Often, these conceptualizations do not reflect their own identity.  This might mean 
that external shame is reduced in group therapy, as sex offenders in group therapy 
may not view themselves in as detrimental a fashion as they do other sex offenders. 
Further, the values of judgments of other sex offenders might seem irrelevant and 
unimportant to the individual sex offender.
It appears overall that issues of shame and guilt would be important to explore at the 
very start of therapy, or even earlier than that, such as at the point of arrest when 
confessions are sought (Gudjonsson, 2006).
Proeve and Howells (2002) note that the limited attention that has been given to 
shame in sex offenders has focused on the aspect of shame that concerns negative 
self-evaluation.  They propose that there should be a greater emphasis on the facet of 
shame relating to scrutiny by others.  Hence, an interesting area of research might be 
differences in external and internal shame within sex offender populations.
51The predominant approach to the treatment of sex offenders in the UK is the risk- 
need model, which is primarily concerned with risk management and the protection 
of the community (Andrews and Bonta, 1998).  An example of this would be the Sex 
Offender Treatment Programme (SOTP).  Prisons in England and Wales have been 
conducting SOTP’s since 1991.  This is cognitive-behavioural group treatment that 
aims to change the way offenders think about their crimes and their victims (PDH, 
2006).
Conversely the good-lives approach aims to enhance offenders’ skills and self­
esteem in order to improve their quality of life and hence lessen the chances of re­
offending when released into the community (Marshall et al, 2005).  This is based 
on the premise that basic human needs motivate people to want certain outcomes 
such as relationships, food, autonomy (goods) etc. for optimal functioning.  In the 
case of sexually abusive behaviour the problem is located in the means used to 
secure goods, e.g. seeking the primary human goods of intimacy and mastery in a 
sexual relationship with a child.  It has been suggested by Marshall et al. (2005) that 
the focus on risk factors is a necessary but not sufficient treatment goal, and that the 
risk-need approach should be grounded in the good lives model, which is concerned 
with giving individuals the necessary conditions to lead better lives.
It is the view of the present author that Tangney and Dealing’s (2002) outlook 
regarding self-conscious emotions would be highly relevant to both approaches of 
sex offender treatment. The risk-need model approach for sex offenders places an 
emphasis on empathy training.  As previously stated, if shame inhibits empathy in
52sex offenders by way of a global self-focus, it would seem important to intervene at a 
level that nurtures guilt and discourages shame, in order for a pathway to empathy to 
be created and barriers to it broken down.  The good-lives approach stresses that 
reduction in recidivism should not be the sole aim of treatment, as this results in 
treatment programs that offenders may find hard to engage with as they may be 
considered rather irrelevant to them personally, and possibly also disempowering 
(Marshall et al., 2005).
The good-lives approach considers the securing of goods, such as friendship, loving 
relationships and positive self-regard to be of paramount importance in the treatment 
of sex offenders.  As has been demonstrated in this literature review, the tendency to 
experience shame as opposed to guilt has many disadvantages, and a significant 
feature of shame is the tendency to focus on the self.  It would appear therefore, that 
shame is an obstacle to the development of healthy, empathic relationships, as well 
as positive self-regard, hence that this powerful emotion stymies the securing of 
goods.  Reflecting on sex offender treatment highlights, even further, that addressing 
issues of shame in sexual offenders should be incorporated early in treatment.
Tangney and Dearing (2002) suggest that an exploration and appreciation of shame 
and guilt should be implemented as part of treatment programs for offenders in 
general, with the intention that a sense of guilt, rather than shame is encouraged, 
allowing offenders to accept responsibility for their crimes.  They assert, in view of 
shame’s association with maladaptive functioning, that shame-inducing sanctions 
should not be imposed.
53This issue appears to be very relevant to the approach taken to sex offenders in 
particular.  For example, in 2001, the News of the World newspaper developed a 
campaign for the naming and shaming of paedophiles (Do we need a ‘Sarah’s Law’?
2001).  This campaign can be seen as a media provider’s attempt to tune into 
society’s emotional reaction to what is considered by the great majority as abhorrent 
behaviour, and provide a sense of control and containment through the proactive 
measure of naming sex offenders.
However, as explained by Bumby et a l, (1999), imposing a sense of shame on sex 
offenders engenders a negative appraisal of the self that discourages taking 
responsibility for behaviour.  On the contrary, guilt reflects distress over engaging in 
particular behaviours and encourages taking responsibility and initiating change.
This approach may result in offenders’ consideration of the effects of their offences 
on victims, reparative action, higher levels of self-efficacy, more adaptive coping, 
and consequently decreased risk of re-offending (Bumby et al, 1999). Hudson, Ward 
and Marshall (1992) put forward a similar conceptualization, highlighting that 
exploring this distinction should help offenders recognise that guilt, but not shame, is 
helpful.
VIII Conclusion
As has been reviewed in this paper, there is an emerging finding in various 
populations that high levels of shame are associated with low levels of empathy, and 
it has been postulated that shame acts as a barrier to the experience of empathy, 
whereas guilt acts as a catalyst to empathy.  The underlying theoretical foundations 
are very interesting and evidence is developing in support of these ideas.  However
54findings have not been entirely consistent, and there is very little evidence of these 
relationships within the self-conscious emotions in sex offenders; A population that 
is considered by some to harbour extensive levels of shame.  The data in support of 
the proposed inter-relationships between shame, guilt and empathy also appear to be 
wholly questionnaire-based, which gives rise to concerns regarding honesty in 
responding.  This might be particularly relevant in forensic settings.  No distinctions 
have yet been made between internal and external shame in sex offenders, and this 
population seems to be one where light shed on the workings of the self-conscious 
emotions would be particularly enlightening, especially given the emphasis of 
empathy training as treatment for sex offenders.  Research into shame, and its 
relationship to guilt and empathy in sex offenders is much needed, and investigators 
might gain a clearer picture of these inter-relationships if the repertoire of 
measurement was extended beyond questionnaires only.
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74Part 2: Empirical PaperABSTRACT
Objectives: To investigate the inter-relationships between shame, guilt and empathy 
in sexual offenders and prisoners without convictions of sexual offending, as well as 
group differences in these emotions.
Background: Previous research (Tangney, 1991) indicates a negative relationship 
between shame and empathy, and a positive relationship between guilt and empathy. 
These associations have not been investigated in depth amongst sex offenders. 
Method and design: Sex offenders (28 males from one prison and two medium 
secure units) and non-sex offenders (28 males drawn from the general population of 
a prison who had never been convicted of sexual offences) participated in one-to-one 
interviews using published questionnaires and also a repertory grid (Kelly, 1955) 
measuring shame, guilt and empathy.
Results: Sex offenders had significantly higher Empathic Concern compared to non­
sex offenders.  Within the sample of offenders overall, Personal Distress was 
significantly correlated with both shame and guilt.  The findings were interpreted in 
light of the available literature, however it was concluded that the diffuse effects of 
social desirability may have invalidated the results.
Conclusions: Overall, the proposed relationships between shame, guilt and empathy 
were not found, and the one that was (correlation between shame and personal 
distress) may have been an effect of social desirability.  None of the expected 
differences between the two groups were found.  It was concluded that the present 
study did not allow a fair assessment of these relationships.
76INTRODUCTION
This paper reports on an investigation into the role of shame in sex offenders.  In this 
introductory section shame is described and discussed in relation to other emotions. 
The impact of shame and guilt on empathy is considered both in the general 
population and more specifically in sex offenders.  Personal construct theory 
provides a framework for investigating sex offenders and this approach is described.
Shame
Shame has been defined as the feeling experienced as a result of the unfavourable 
self-evaluation, or perceived evaluation from others, of one’s feelings, behaviour and 
overall character.  Shame is experienced in response to a perceived judgement of the 
whole self.  Being a threat emotion, shame is characterised by a wish to hide, 
disappear or even die (Lewis, 1995).  The shame experience encompasses a feeling 
of being small, and a sense of exposure in front of a real or imagined audience 
(Covert, Tangney, Maddux and Heleno, 2003).
Historically, shame has taken the form of the “hidden emotion” in psychopathology 
(Gilbert, 1988).  Lewis (1987) spoke of unacknowledged shame, and its destructive 
consequences, having found that shame was ubiquitous but not discussed in 
psychotherapy sessions, and was instead ignored, disguised or denied (Scheff and 
Retzinger, 1997).  She proposed that failing to confront shame in the therapeutic 
relationship was a frequent source of therapeutic impasse and symptom formation 
(Lewis, 1987).
77According to Lewis (1987), there is a strong connection between shame and anger. 
Retzinger (1991) found that unacknowledged shame was a consistent precursor to 
anger, when analysing transcripts of quarrels between married couples.  Based on 
this evidence, Scheff and Retzinger (1991) put forward a theory of shame/rage loops 
culminating in violence.  They proposed that unacknowledged and un-discharged 
shame does not subside, but instead forms a shame-shame (resulting in withdrawal) 
or shame-rage (resulting in verbal or physical violence) loop.
Lewis (1971, 1976, and 1987) conceived a form of shame therapy where anger was 
acknowledged and traced back to shame.  Analysis of therapy sessions indicated that 
feelings of shame were masked in verbal attack or withdrawal, indicating that 
feelings of shame and humiliation were too painful to be revealed, even to patients 
themselves.  Instead of disclosing feelings of shame, patients sought to humiliate the 
therapist in return, resulting in a humiliation-counter-humiliation sequence (Scheff 
and Retzinger, 1997).
Lewis (1971) differentiated between overt and bypassed shame.  Overt shame is 
characterised by emotional pain and unwanted physical symptoms such as sweating 
and blushing.  This type of shame is visible to others and within the bearer’s 
awareness.  Conversely, bypassed shame is much less available to consciousness and 
is marked by repetitive, obsessive thoughts and slightly incongruous speech.  It is 
also associated with shame-anger loops (Scheff and Retzinger, 1997).  The research 
of Lewis (1971) indicated that men have proclivities towards bypassed shame 
(Lewis, 1987), in that they may bypass the painful experience of shame by becoming
78angry.  However, they are ashamed of their anger and angry that they are ashamed 
(Scheff and Retzinger, 1997).
Gilbert (1997) distinguishes internal from external shame, the former being a sense 
of failure at meeting ones own standards, and the latter a perception that others have 
judged them negatively.  These two forms of shame are not necessarily correlated: 
for instance, as highlighted by Lewis (1992), if one has no expectation that their 
flaws would be revealed in front of others, they may not experience any shame about 
them.  This may be the case, for example, in a situation where a politician is involved 
in a financial scandal that they claim to be regretful or apparently ignorant of once 
the scandal has been made public.  Their external shame may be high, in stark 
contrast to their experiences of internal shame.
Shame and Guilt
Despite the tendency for the terms ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ to be used interchangeably, 
research suggests that these two emotional states are discrete (Tangney, Marschall, 
Rosenberg, Barlow, and Wagner, 1994 [cited in Tangney and Dearing, 2002]). 
Whereas in shame the self negatively evaluates the entire self, motivates anger, and 
draws any attention away from the distressed other back to the self, guilt is a self­
judgement of particular behaviours that has a specific focus, and is associated with 
empathy for the harmed other and reparative action (Lewis, 1971).  Guilt is an 
unpleasant state, but much less painful than shame.  In guilt, the focus is on the moral 
transgression, autonomic responses may be less pronounced, and one does not feel 
exposed (Lewis, 1987).
79Shame, Guilt and Empathy
Tangney and Dearing (2002) propose a link between empathy and guilt, and an 
inverse relationship between empathy and shame.  Feshbach (1975) described 
empathy as comprising cognitive elements (such as perspective-taking ability), 
affective cue discrimination (accurate perception of the affective states of others) and 
emotional responsiveness (the ability to experience a range of emotion).  Davis 
(1983) draws a distinction between self-oriented distress and other-oriented empathy 
as emotional reactions to another’s distress, in his Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI; 1983), that also measures perspective-taking; Both in real life and in the 
fictional realm.  The Personal Distress Scale measures the extent to which 
individuals experience self-oriented fear or discomfort in response to the distress of 
another person, whereas the Empathic Concern Scale measures the degree to which 
other-oriented feelings of concern and compassion are experienced (Tangney and 
Dearing, 2002).
Based on their promising findings reflecting this relationship, Tangney and Dearing 
(2002) proposed a positive association between guilt and empathy.  Guilt was found 
to be associated with both Davis’s (1980) Perspective Taking and Empathic Concern 
scales of the IRI.  In addition they found that proneness to shame was associated with 
high scores on Davis’s (1983) Personal Distress scale, and inversely or negligibly 
related to other-oriented empathy, depending on the empathy measure used.  These 
findings were evident to some extent across several independent studies using 
various populations (Tangney and Dearing, 1991, 2002).
80The intense self-focus of shame appears to be antithetical to the other-oriented nature 
of true empathy.  Tangney and Dearing (2002) assert that empathy and guilt operate 
in unison, with guilt being instrumental in preventing misdemeanours, and empathy 
being significant in their resolution.  Conversely, shame appears to impede empathy. 
This may be due to egoistic drift (Hoffman, 1984), where one becomes distracted and 
preoccupied with their own emotional experience of personal distress when 
confronted with another individual in distress.  Consequently, instead of maintaining 
an emphasis on the other person’s experience and needs, the inward-focus of shame 
and its associated personal distress may impede a true empathic response (Tangney 
and Dearing, 2002).
Alternatively or in addition, an empathic response may be halted by the impact of 
shame, due to the reduced capacity of a shame-prone person to experience a normal 
range of emotions (Roys, 1997) further to the overpowering nature of shame.  As a 
result, the capacity for appreciating the range of emotions of others is impaired 
(Roys, 1997).
Further support for Tangney and Dearing’s (2002) theory comes from studies where 
undergraduates described recent experiences of interpersonal conflict, both from 
their own and their partners’ perspectives (Leith and Baumeister, 1988).  A clear 
finding was that those whose descriptions involved guilt had a greater propensity 
towards shifting perspectives, and less consistently, that descriptions that were 
coloured by shame were associated with impaired perspective-taking (Leith and 
Baumeister, 1988; Tangney and Dearing, 2002).
81Further, research suggests that individuals who are prone to experiencing shame are 
also inclined to externalise blame (Tangney, 1990; Burggraf, 1989 [as cited in 
Tangney, 1991]), and this is also likely to hamper the experience of empathy 
(Tangney, 1991).  Finally, induced shame in participants who were not shame-prone 
resulted in diminished empathy for a disabled individual (Marschall, 1996 [cited in 
Tangney and Dearing, 2002]).
In sum, shame inhibits other-oriented empathy, and this process is mediated by an 
excessive negative self-focus, a limited repertoire of affective experience, blaming of 
others, and hostility (Proeve and Howells, 2002).
Shame and Sex Offenders
Scheff and Retzinger (1997) assert that sex offenders feel ashamed because they 
have been publicly condemned for wrongdoing.  They also hold, based on a series of 
investigations into rapists (Marshall and Marshall, 1981 [cited in Scheff and 
Retzinger, 1997]; Marshall and Turner, 1985 [cited in Scheff and Retzinger, 1997]; 
Lawson et. al  1979), that sex offenders are insecure about their masculinity.  It was 
found that levels of self-esteem (the degree to which one values oneself, Reber,
1985), were bi-modally distributed amongst this population, in that most of these 
men yielded either very low or very high scores.  Although it may hold that pride is 
the foundation of high self-esteem and that persistent shame forms the basis of low 
self-esteem, the scales employed did not consider the participant’s defence 
mechanisms, such as exaggerated confidence in self as a defence against shame 
(Scheff and Retzinger, 1997).  Prison staff who knew the participants evaluated them 
using the same scale, and it was reported that those who yielded high scores in fact
82had low levels of self-esteem according to staff, compensated for with a strong sense 
of bravado (Lawson et. al., 1979; Scheff and Retzinger, 1997).
Scheff and Retzinger (1997) purport that self-esteem is based on shame and pride, 
and that measures of self-esteem used in the cited research confound genuine pride 
with exaggerated self-confidence.  They assert that the exaggerated aggressiveness 
and machismo of sex offenders may be created by unacknowledged shame about 
sexuality.
According to Scheff and Retzinger (1997), successful understanding and treatment of 
sex offenders is impeded by their repressed and hidden shame, and offenders must 
reach the point of sharing and communicating their shame in order for treatment to 
be effective.  It would follow from this perspective that shame is rife in this 
population of sexually-insecure men who have been publicly condemned for acts of 
abuse that are generally viewed by society as unacceptable.  Many sex offenders are 
segregated in an independent unit within prisons, in order to protect them from the 
hostility and aggression expressed by other types of offenders towards sex offenders, 
for the perceived unacceptability of their behaviour.  It would therefore be expected 
that levels of external shame would be higher amongst sex offenders compared to 
other types of offenders.  There has been very little empirical research concerning 
shame in sex offenders, although Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson (1994) conducted a 
study and found some evidence of higher shame in sex offenders relative to other 
offenders.
83A significant positive association between shame-proneness, personal distress, self- 
consciousness, and extemalisation was found amongst a small sample of sexual 
offenders in outpatient treatment, in a study carried out by Bumby, Levine and 
Cunningham (1996, as cited in Schwartz, 1999).  This study also found that 
offenders who were guilt-prone had higher empathy levels.  Unfortunately this paper 
was presented at a conference and never published, and there is no detailed record of 
the methods employed or the measures used in this study.  However, it is in line with 
the general findings concerning shame, guilt and empathy in the general population, 
and provides some evidence that the finding of significant positive associations 
between shame and personal distress, and guilt and empathy, may also apply to sex 
offenders.  Given what is proposed about the effect of shame on empathy, and the 
likely prevalence of shame amongst sex offenders, it would follow that investigation 
of these self-conscious emotions within the sex offending population would be a 
worthy area of research.
Shame and Guilt in Sex Offenders and Personal Construct Theory
Personal Construct Theory (PCT) offers a way of understanding how offenders see 
the world, and provides techniques such as the repertory grid for understanding the 
structure and content of construing.  PCT gives an insight into what is unique about 
that particular individual (Houston, 2003).  McCoy (1977) describes shame in PCT 
terms as “awareness of dislodgement of the self from another’s construing of your 
role”.  Guilt has been defined as “the awareness of dislodgement of the self from 
one’s core role structure” (Kelly, 1955) and core role structure is generally explained 
in the PCT literature as the way in which one’s self-identifying constructs are 
interrelated (Houston, 2003).  The definition of internal shame (described above) is
84consistent with the PCT definition of guilt, and definitions of external shame 
correspond to the PCT definition of shame.
For  some  offenders,  being  an  abuser  may  be  part  of  their  core  role.  Any 
dislodgement  from  such  a  role  might  elicit  negative  affect,  which  may  only  be 
relieved  by sexual experiences  that affirm  their original  self-constructions.  Kelly 
(1969a [cited in Horley, 2003]) refers to a concept called ‘slot rattling’ where the self 
is  reconstrued at the opposite pole  of a construct to  which it had originally been 
assigned. In slot rattling a person internalises both poles of a construct, for example 
in an abusive relationship the abused would internalise both the role of the abuser 
and  the  abused.  This  is  in  line  with Cordess  and  Cox  (2004)  who  postulate  that 
victims can become both victims and victimizers, as it is the relationship with the 
object, the self in relation to the other, that is internalized.  It has been suggested that 
for some, acts of violence may be a manifestation of slot rattling, from a view of the 
self as  weak  to  one characterised  by  power  (Horley,  2003).  Slot rattling  may  be 
observed in the victim of abuse who then abuses others (Adshead, 1994).
PCT would therefore hold that in sexual offenders for whom being an abuser is part 
of their core role, behaving in a way that is consistent with their self-view, i.e. 
committing sexual offences, should not lead to significant guilt.  Conversely, for 
those individuals who do not see themselves as abusers, committing sexual offences 
should theoretically result in discomfort as a result of this inconsistency between 
self-view and actual behaviour.  It would fit with this theory therefore, that sex 
offenders who have never themselves been sexually abused should have higher levels 
of guilt compared to sex offenders with a history of sexual abuse.
85The PCT research into sex offenders emphasizes how such offenders construe their 
victims in order to avoid guilt, for instance, by construing their victims as consenting 
to the abuse, or having behaved provocatively, hence, not construing their own 
behaviour as harmful (Houston, 1998; Howells, 1979; Horley, 1988).  Some 
offenders acknowledge the sexual nature of their behaviour, but their very tight 
construing of sexual offenders refers only to ‘strangers who abduct children’ or 
‘rapists with a knife’ (Houston, 1998), and often does not reflect their own identity.
This drive to reduce guilt may also be apparent in the function of cognitive 
distortions, such as those outlined by Abel, et. al. (1989).  As suggested by Marshall, 
Hamilton and Fernandez (2001), sexual offenders engage in distorted processes in 
order to protect themselves from their own and others’ negative self-judgments. 
Evidence for this includes research carried out by Mihailides, Devilly and Ward 
(2004).  Given the tendency for sex offenders to distance themselves from being a 
sex offender by, for instance, construing their behaviour as not harmful, or viewing 
their victims as consenting, it might be expected that sex offenders would have lower 
levels of internal shame compared to non-sex offenders.
Empathy in Sex Offenders
There is a consensus that lack of empathy is a significant factor in the perpetration of 
sexual offences (Marshall, Anderson and Fernandez, 1999).  Whereas some studies 
indicate that this relates to empathy in general (such as that of Rice, Chaplain, Harris 
and Coutts, 1994), there is a trend towards the notion that sex offenders do not lack 
empathy per se, but that their empathy deficits are limited to their perceptions of
86their victims.  The differentiation between victim-specific empathy and general 
empathy is indicated by a growing body of evidence (Fernandez, Marschall, 
Lightbody and O’Sullivan, 1999; Fernandez and Marschall [as cited in Marshall, 
Hamilton and Fernandez, 2001]; Marshall, Champagne, Brown and Miller, 1997). 
Hence, it would follow that there should be no difference in empathy in general, 
between sex-offenders and non-sex offenders.
Shame, Guilt and Empathy in Sex Offenders
Extending the research of Tangney (1991; 1994; 1995a; 1995b; 1995c [as cited in 
Tangney and Dearing, 2002]); Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, Gramzow and Fletcher 
(1991, cited in Tangney and Dearing, 2002), it would be expected that the inverse 
relationship evident between shame and empathy may also be apparent in the sex 
offender population.  Bumby, Marshall and Langton (1999) hypothesized that 
internal, global and stable attributions made by sex offenders to explain their 
behaviour resulted in shame, making further offending more likely due to increased 
cognitive distortions, personal distress, extemalization of blame, and decreased 
victim-specific empathy.  Conversely, they postulated that if guilt was experienced, 
offenders might reflect on the effects of their behaviour on victims, potentially 
leading to reparative action.  They, in line with Hudson, Ward and Marshall (1992), 
suggest that treatment should emphasize guilt rather than shame, as the former 
reflects distress at one’s behaviour and fosters responsibility and change, in contrast 
to shame.
87The Present Study
This study aims to measure levels of shame, guilt and empathy in sex offenders, and 
compare them with those of non-sex offenders.  All questionnaires used will be trait- 
based, and have been selected because as a battery they generally measure internal 
shame, external shame and guilt as discreet entities (although see section on 
Measures for full details).  The empathy measure has been selected because it has a 
separate scale for personal distress; An aspect of empathy that has been found to 
correlate with shame.  It is also a comprehensive measure that encompasses both 
cognitive and affective aspects of empathy.  Repertory grid technique elicits both 
direct and indirect measures and is therefore less susceptible to social desirability.
Given the emphasis of empathy training on psychological treatment for sex 
offenders, and also the emerging moderate, but mixed evidence that shame and 
empathy, (the latter being an emotion that is positively associated with guilt) are 
inversely related within some populations, the proposed relationships between 
shame, guilt and empathy were investigated in a sample of 28 sex offenders, and 28 
non-sex offenders.
As previously detailed, in Tangney’s (1991) studies two scales of empathy were used 
overall.  Whereas the inverse relationship between shame and empathy was observed 
when the ESA (Feshbach and Lipian [1987], as cited in Tangney and Dearing 
[2002]) was employed as a measure of empathy, this relationship did not appear to 
exist when measuring empathy with the IRI.  This raises questions regarding the 
validity of different scales measuring the same emotions.  In this study, the IRI will
88be used as a measure of empathy, as its relationship to shame is of interest and 
uncertain.
Due to the interest in separating out internal from external shame, separate measures 
will be employed for each of these types of shame.  Finally, the guilt measure has 
been selected for its brevity.  All measures used in this study are trait-based.
The present study fills some significant gaps in the literature, the most obvious being 
addressing the inter-relationships between self-conscious emotions amongst sex 
offenders.  Findings concerning shame, guilt and empathy in sex offenders are based 
largely on one study with incomplete detail.  It would appear though, that that these 
complex interactions might bear significance on the emotional reactions and further, 
the behaviour of sex offenders.  Distinctions between external and internal shame 
have not been empirically investigated as yet, moving the research on shame and 
empathy in sex offenders a further step forward.
Based on the empirical findings and theoretical underpinnings discussed in this 
paper, it is specifically hypothesised that:
1.  For sex  offenders,  shame and  other-oriented  empathy will  be inversely 
related.  This relationship will also be observed in the sample overall.
2.  Amongst  sex  offenders,  other-oriented  empathy  and  guilt  will  be 
positively correlated.  This will also be observed in the sample as a whole.
893.  Shame  and  personal  distress  will  be  positively  correlated  amongst  sex 
offenders.  This relationship will also be observed when the whole sample 
is taken together.
4.  Upon  comparing  sex  offenders  and  non-sex  offenders  on  measures  of 
shame and empathy, there will be no difference in empathy but higher 
levels of external shame amongst sex-offenders as compared to non-sex 
offenders.
5.  Sex  offenders  will  have  lower  internal  shame  compared  to  non-sex 
offenders.
6.  Sex  offenders  with  no  histories  of sexual  abuse will be more  likely to 
experience guilt than those with previous histories of abuse.
7.  Taking the sample as a whole, questionnaire measures of shame, guilt and 
empathy will be positively correlated with repertory grid measures of the 
same variables.
90METHOD
Participants
All participants were English-speaking, incarcerated men, none of whom were 
diagnosed with a learning disability or neurological disorder.  Sex offenders were 
recruited from an inner-city prison and two medium security hospitals.  Non-sex 
offenders were recruited from prison only.  Participants were classed as sex offenders 
if they had received a conviction for rape or indecent assault on an adult or child, for 
unlawful sexual intercourse with a child, or for the possession of indecent 
photographs.  The comparison group of non-sex offenders consisted of men drawn 
from the general prison population whose offences ranged from burglary to 
attempted murder.  These men had not necessarily been convicted for their crimes, 
and had never been convicted of a sexual offence on any previous occasion. 
Participants were invited to take part in a study about feelings in people who had 
committed offences.  The study was granted ethical approval from various research 
ethics committees (see Appendices).  Written informed consent was obtained from 
all participants (see Appendices).
Medium security hospitals
In the medium secure hospitals, Consultant Psychiatrists overseeing the care of sex 
offenders were written to and the inclusion criteria were explicated.  Consultants 
responded with signed consent forms allowing the researcher to contact men whom 
they recommended as participants in the study, and also to have access to their notes.
91The researcher, who gave a very brief description of the study, approached these 
men, and they were asked if they were interested in participating.
Prison
Prison officers, while taking into account the exclusion criteria, made 
recommendations of potential sex offender participants.  This was also true for non­
sex offenders, but for the men who were recommended from this population, the 
process was slightly different as it was necessary to ensure that they had no previous 
convictions for any sexual offences.  Hence, prior to the researcher approaching 
them, their previous convictions were investigated for the presence of sexual 
offences by liaising with staff who were authorized to check these records. Once it 
was established that participants met the inclusion criteria, these men were also 
approached by the researcher, given a very brief description of the study, and asked 
if they were interested in participating.
Design
This study employed a mixed design, with some parts of the study being between 
subjects and other parts being within subjects.  The independent variable was group 
status and the dependent variables were internal shame (as measured by the 
Internalised Shame Scale), external shame (as measured by the Other as Shamer 
Scale), guilt (as measured by the guilt sub-scale of the Hostility and Direction of 
Hostility Questionnaire), empathy (as measured by the four scales of the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index), internal shame (as measured indirectly by the 
repertory grid), external shame (as measured both directly and indirectly by the
92repertory grid), guilt (as measured both directly and indirectly by the repertory grid), 
and empathy (as measured directly by the repertory grid).
Measures
The Internalised Shame Scale (ISS: Cook. 1988) is a 30-item test that is composed of 
two scales, one measuring internalised shame (24 items) and the other measuring 
self-esteem.  For this study only the shame scale was analysed due to the topic under 
investigation.  This trait-based measure uses a five-point scale, with responses 
ranging from “never” to “almost always”, and is a construct-valid and reliable 
instrument.  Correlations with other affects that are theoretically linked with shame 
have been found to be significant, as measured by an affect checklist (Rybak and 
Brown, 1996).  The scale has been found to be reliable, with Chronbach’s alphas in 
the 0.90s (Turner and Lee, 1998), indicating good item homogeneity.  Overall the 
ISS appears to be a measure of internal shame, although a small proportion of the 
items seem to relate to external shame.
The Other as Shamer Scale (Goss. Gilbert and Allan. 1994) was employed as a 
measure of external shame, and is an adaptation of the Internalised Shame Scale.  It 
consists of 18 items, and uses a very similar 5-point scale.  This trait-based measure 
has been shown to have good psychometric properties (Goss et al.,  1994).  It 
correlates significantly with other measures of shame, such as the Internalised Shame 
Scale (r = 0.81, Goss et. al,  1994).
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis. 19831 was used to measure empathy. 
There are four, seven-item sub-scales within this measure, each tapping a different
93aspect of empathy: Fantasy (tendency to identify with fictitious characters); 
Perspective Taking (tendency to appreciate the views of others); Empathic Concern 
(tendency to experience feelings of warmth and compassion towards distressed 
others); Personal Distress (tendency to experience discomfort in response to the 
distress of others).  The IRI is a trait-based instrument that uses a five-point scale, 
with responses ranging from ‘nothing like me’ to ‘a lot like me’.  Moderate 
associations have been found between the subscales of this Index and the Empathy 
Quotient (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen and David, 2004), suggesting 
concurrent validity.  The subscales have been found to have good construct validity, 
e.g. Davis (1983) found that the subscales correlated with various other measures of 
social functioning, such as sensitivity to others.  Internal reliabilities have been found 
to be satisfactory (range = .71-.77), as have test-retest reliabilities (.60-.82) (Davis, 
1980).
The guilt sub-scale of The Hostility and Direction of Hostility Questionnaire (Caine. 
Foulds and Hope. 1967). a trait-based measure, was used in this study to measure 
guilt.  A modified version of the method of criterion groups was used in the 
validation of this measure.  A consideration of the rank order of the various clinical 
groups on the subtests of the Hostility and Direction of Hostility Questionnaire 
suggests that each subtest is measuring that aspect of hostility (Caine et. al, 1967). 
For the guilt subscale, highest means were yielded by melancholics and lowest 
means were obtained for normals, providing evidence of criterion validity.  There is 
also evidence for the reliability of this measure, with the test re-test correlation being 
0.75.  The fact that it is an older questionnaire has strengths, as it is well-established 
and widely used, however this also means that a small proportion of the items appear
94to include shame.  An advantage is that this seven-item questionnaire is very quick to 
complete.
The Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis, 1993) assesses the severity of symptoms 
of psychological distress experienced over the past week, and is designed to reflect 
the psychological symptom patterns of psychiatric and medical patients as well as 
non-patients.  Each of the inventory’s 53 items is rated on a 5-point scale of distress, 
ranging from “not at all” (0) to “extremely” (4).  It yields nine symptom dimensions 
and three global indices of distress, the latter of which will be reported in this study 
as they are considered more reliable than self-ratings of discrete symptoms 
(Derogatis, 1993).  The three dimensions are the Global Severity Index (a measure of 
distress level), the Positive Symptom Total (an indication of the extent of the distress 
level) and the Positive Symptom Distress Index (a reflection of distress style).  This 
scale has been found to be psychometrically robust.  The internal consistency 
coefficients indicate that the items selected to represent each symptom construct are 
homogenous (Range = 0.71-0.85).  The test re-test coefficients suggest that this scale 
provides consistent measurement across time (Range = 0.68-0.91; Derogatis, 1993).
Repertory grid technique (Kelly. 1955) is a widely used technique that allows the 
exploration of an individual’s personal meanings.  Administering the grid involved 
the elicitation from the individual of a sample of their constructs (adjectives) by 
asking them to compare and contrast a group of ‘elements’ (aspects of the self and 
significant others) (see list of elements in Appendices).  Participants were also 
provided with three constructs: Shame, guilt and empathy, and definitions for these 
terms were given.  They were then asked to rate each of the elements on a seven-
95point scale on each of the constructs.  The resultant repertory grid was analysed using 
the Gridcor (Version 4) computer package (Feixas and Cornejo, 2002), which allows 
the derivation of a range of both direct and indirect measures of self-conscious 
emotions.
In this study, external shame (labelled as ‘shame’ and defined as ‘feeling that other 
people judge you negatively’), guilt (defined as ‘judging your behaviour negatively’) 
and empathy (defined as ‘being able to really understand how someone else feels’) 
were measured directly, based on ratings of the element ‘myself now’ on those 
constructs.  Internal shame, external shame and guilt were also measured indirectly, 
by measuring the distances in perceptions of pairs of elements.  In line with personal 
construct theory, internal shame was measured by calculating the distance between 
the elements ‘myself now’ and ‘ideal self, external shame was measured by 
calculating the distance between ‘myself now’ and ‘how others think I should be’ 
and guilt was measured by calculating the distance between ‘myself now’ and 
‘myself before the offence’.  There is considerable evidence for the validity and 
reliability of grid measures (Fransella, Bell and Bannister, 2004).
Additional information from the grid: Tightness of construing and dissociation 
A useful way of describing a person’s way of construing the world is in terms of the 
tightness of their construct system.  If one’s construing is very tight, their constructs 
are largely connected and lead to unvarying predictions.  For example, a person who 
is ‘clever’ is also ‘successful’, implying a close association in the construer’s view of 
the world between those two qualities.  Their view of the world is likely to be rigid 
and inflexible.  Conversely, in loose construing there is little connection between
96individual constructs and how they are applied (Houston, 1998).  Tightness of 
construing will be measured by considering the percentage of variation accounted for 
by the first component (the greater the percentage, the tighter the construct system).
Dissociation is a term used to describe the perceived distance between the self and 
others who engage in similar problematic behaviour.  Dissociation can be understood 
as a mechanism to protect self-esteem by distancing oneself from negative 
stereotypes of other people with similar behaviour (Winter, 1992).  A measure of 
dissociation will be obtained by calculating the distance between the elements 
‘myself now’ and ‘the sort of person who would commit a sexual offence / an 
offence like mine’.
Procedure
Once in a private interview room, the study was discussed in more detail, participants 
were given an Information Sheet (see Appendices), and consent was taken.  Given 
the degree of literacy problems amongst the offending population all measures were 
presented orally (in the order listed above) and the process took the form of an 
interview, with responses being written down by the researcher.  At the end of the 
interview participants were asked if they had ever experienced sexual abuse.  They 
were also asked if they would like to be provided with Written feedback about the 
research when the study was over.  Finally, demographic and background 
information was obtained from participants’ notes.
1  All participants who requested written feedback about the study were sent a debriefing letter (see 
Appendix) in the ensuing months.
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Preliminary Analysis
All variables were examined for accuracy of data entry, missing values and 
appropriateness for parametric testing prior to statistical analysis, and outliers were 
removed.  Some variables were slightly skewed, but normality for all variables was 
achieved by performing data transformations.  No variables had significant kurtosis. 
Parametric statistics were used for continuous variables and non-parametric statistics 
were used for categorical variables.
Participants
Sex offenders
There were 28 participants in the sex offender group, and the mean age was 34 years 
old (range = 21-66 years).  Nineteen sex offenders were white, eight were black 
and one was Asian.  Sixteen had been given a psychiatric diagnosis (seven had been 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, five with a mood disorder, two with schizoaffective 
disorder, and two were psychopathic).  Information regarding treatment for their 
sexual offending was only available for the eight sex offenders who were 
hospitalised: Two had received individual psychotherapy, one had participated in 
group psychotherapy, and five had never received treatment.  Ten sex offenders were 
currently detained for sexual offences against children (four for indecent assault, 
three for rape, two for possession of indecent images of children and one for indecent 
exposure), 17 for sexual offences against people aged over 18 (11 for rape, four for 
indecent assault, one for attempted rape of an adult, one for attempted rape of an 
elderly person) and one was incarcerated for grievous bodily harm but had previous
98convictions of sexual assault against children.  Five sex offenders disclosed that they 
themselves had been victims of sexual abuse.
Non-sex offenders
There were 28 participants in the non-sexual offender comparison group, and the 
average age was 32 (range = 21-47 years).  Fourteen non-sex offenders were black, 
13 were white and one was Asian.  Two comparison participants had psychiatric 
diagnoses (psychopathy and depression).  Nine participants in this group were 
currently in prison for burglary, six for violence against the person, four for robbery, 
four for drug offences, two for kidnapping, and one each for breach of bail, criminal 
damage and fraud.  Three non-sex offenders stated that they had experienced sexual 
abuse.
Questionnaire measures
Table 1  presents the means, standard deviations and minimum and maximum scores 
obtained on each of the measures used in this study, for each group.
99Table 1:  Descriptive statistics for questionnaire measures
Aspect being Measured/group Measure Mean Standard
Deviation
Mini­
mum
Maxi­
mum
2BSI(GSI) 0.86 0.70 0.04 2.58
Symptoms sex offenders 3BSI (PST) 23.89 14.42 2 49
4BSI (PSDI) 1.87 0.69 1 3.67
BSI (GSI) 0.86 0.60 0.15 2.47
Symptoms non-sex offenders BSI (PST) 24.50 12 3 48
BSI (PSDI) 1.80 0.71 0.28 3.21
Internal shame sex offenders 3ISS (IS) 36.54 25.21 0.00 87
Internal shame non-sex offenders ISS (IS) 32.61 17.70 8 77
External shame sex offenders OAS 26.57 15.86 2 57
External shame non-sex offenders 6oas 22.07 10.44 2 44
Guilt sex offenders 'HDHQ (Guilt) 3 2.16 0 7
Guilt non-sex offenders HDHQ (Guilt) 2.75 1.82 0 6
S IRI (PT) 16.07 4.88 7 24
Empathy sex 9IRI (F) 13.89 5.16 1 23
Offenders 10IRI (EC) 18.29 4.81 7 27
"IRI(PD) 11.00 5.00 5 25
IRI(PT) 15.57 4.58 5 24
Empathy non­ IRI(F) 13.26 4.51 4 24
sex offenders IRI (EC) 14.93 3.07 9 20
IRI (PD) 10.28 3.90 5 20
In this section, current means and standard deviations are placed in the context of
previously published norms for each of the questionnaire measures.
2 Brief Symptom Inventory (Global Severity  Index)
3 Brief Symptom Inventory (Positive Symptom Total)
4 Brief Symptom Inventory (Positive Symptom Distress Index)
3 Internalised Shame Scale (Internalised Shame)
* Other as Shamer Scale (External Shame)
7 Hostility and Direction of Hostility Questionnaire (Guilt subscale)
8 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Perspective Taking)
9 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Fantasy)
10 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Empathic Concern)
11 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Personal Distress)
100Symptoms
BSI (Derogatis, 1993)
The BSI manual (Derogatis, 1993) reports norms for an American adult psychiatric 
outpatient population (GSI: x = 1.32, sd = 0.72; PST: x = 30.80, sd = 11.63; PSDI: x 
= 2.14, sd = 0.61) and as illustrated in Table 1, the PST means for participants in the 
present study were lower, indicating that the extent of their distress was relatively 
less marked as reflected in fewer reported symptoms.  However, scores for both 
groups on all symptom dimensions of the BSI were similar in this study.
Shame
Internalised Shame Scale (Cook. 1988); Other as Shamer Scale (Goss. Gilbert and 
Allan. 1994)
Goss, Gilbert and Allan (1994) used both the ISS (x = 32.1, sd = 16.2) and OAS (x = 
20.0, sd = 10.1) on a population of British students.  In the present study, the mean 
for internalized shame amongst non-sex offenders (32.61) was consistent with that 
obtained in Goss et. aVs (1994) study, and internal shame amongst sex offenders 
(36.54) was higher.  For external shame, sex offenders yielded higher scores (x = 
26.57) on average than non-sex offenders (x = 22.07), who scored marginally higher 
than the undergraduates in Goss et al’s (1994) study.
101Guilt
The Hostility and Direction of Hostility Questionnaire (Guilt sub-scale: Caine.
Foulds and Hope. 1967)
Hatzitaskos, Soldatos, Sakkas and Stefanis (1997) used the Hostility and Direction of 
Hostility Questionnaire with a sample of men with antisocial personality disorder, 
serving in the Greek Air Force, currently hospitalized for poor psychological 
adjustment (x = 4.1, sd = 1.8).  In the present study means for guilt were similar 
between groups (x = 3 for sex-offenders and 2.75 for non-sex offenders), and slightly 
lower than those reported by Hatzitaskos et. al. (1997).
Empathy
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis. 1983)
Moriarty, Stough, Tidmarsh, Eger and Dennison (2001) administered the IRI to a 
sample of male adolescent sex offenders (Fantasy: x = 12.80, sd = 4.51; Perspective 
Taking: x = 13.87, sd = 4.58; Empathic Concern: x = 13.27, sd = 4.11; Personal 
Distress: x = 12.73, sd = 4.11).  In this study, Fantasy and Perspective Taking were 
relatively slightly higher (x = 13.89 and 16.07 respectively for sex offenders; x = 
13.26 and 15.57, respectively, for non-sex offenders), Personal Distress was 
relatively slightly lower (x = 11 and 10.28 for sex offenders and non-sex offenders, 
respectively), and Empathic Concern was generally higher (x = 18.29 and 14.93 for 
sex offenders and non-sex offenders, respectively) than reported means from 
Moriarty et. aTs (2001) study.  A study investigating empathy among medical 
students found that mean scores on Fantasy, Perspective Taking and Empathic
102Concern were 16.6 (sd = 6.0), 18.8 (sd = 4.5) and 20.3 (sd = 3.9) respectively, which 
are higher scores than in the current investigation and previously cited study. 
Personal Distress, conversely, was 8 (4.2) among medical students, lower than the 
other studies (Bellini and Shea, 2005).  In the present study levels of Empathic 
Concern amongst non-sex offenders were fairly consistent with the adolescent sex 
offenders in Moriarty et. al. ’s (2001) study, and levels of empathic concern amongst 
sex offenders were more consistent with levels of this aspect of empathy reported in 
medical students.
Statistical Analysis
Two-tailed tests were used as it was decided that none of the predictions were based 
on associations or differences that were well-enough established to warrant one­
tailed tests.
Characteristics of sample
There were no significant differences between sex offenders and non-sex offenders 
in terms of age (t (46) = 0.96; p = 0.34), ethnicity (x2(l) = 2.63; p = 0.11), current 
symptoms (BSI/GSI: t (52) = -.274, p = 0.79; BSI/PST: t (54) = -.171, p = 0.87; 
BSI/PSDI: t (54) = 0.40, p = 0.69) or previous experience of sexual abuse (x*(l) = 
0.58; p = 0.71).  However, significantly more sex offenders had been given 
psychiatric diagnoses than non-sex offenders (x*(l) = 16.05; p = 0.001).
103Questionnaire data
Outliers and Transformations
There were two outliers for the GSI subscale of the BSI (one in each group), and a 
further two outliers amongst non-sex offenders: One present in the OAS and the 
other in the Fantasy subscale of the IRI.  All outliers were removed.
The GSI subscale of the BSI was slightly negatively skewed in the non-sex offender 
group (skewness = 1.104), however, normality was achieved further to a square root 
transformation being performed (skewness = 0.52).
Group differences between shame, guilt and empathy
To control for the effects of psychiatric illness, a one-factor ‘group’ (sex offenders 
Vs non-sex offenders) Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was carried 
out with psychiatric diagnosis as a covariate, and questionnaire measures of shame, 
guilt and empathy as dependent variables.  The analysis revealed that there was no 
significant multivariate difference in shame, guilt and empathy between the two 
groups (F (7, 45) = 1.3, P = 0.26).  However, univariate analysis revealed that sex 
offenders had significantly higher levels of empathic concern compared to non-sex 
offenders (F(l,51) = 7.75,/? = 0.01).  This finding was confirmed with an 
independent samples t-test (t(45.8) = 3.11;  p = 0.001), and is graphically illustrated 
in Figure 1.
104Figure 1  Empathic Concern amongst sex offenders and non-sex offenders
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As not enough sex offenders (for the purposes of statistical analysis) admitted to 
having experienced sexual abuse, it was not possible to explore differences between 
sex offenders in levels of guilt depending on whether or not they themselves had 
been abused.
Correlations between variables
As it was predicted that the relationships between the self-conscious emotions would 
also exist for non-sex offenders, Pearson correlation coefficients were performed 
between the various measures of shame, guilt and empathy taking the entire sample 
as a whole.
105An attempt was made to reduce the number of correlations performed by collapsing 
the three other-oriented empathy scales together to create the single variable ‘other- 
oriented empathy’ and by collapsing internal and external shame creating the 
variable ‘shame’.  However as demonstrated in Table 2, not all of the other-oriented 
empathy scales were highly correlated, therefore only the latter operation was 
possible.
Correlations between questionnaire measures
Table 2:  Correlations between shame, guilt and empathy
IRI IRI IRI IRI (F) ISS OAS Shame Guilt
(PT) (EC) (PD) (ISS)
IRI 0.29* 0.11 0.49** 0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.05
(PT)
IRI 0.01 0.24 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.10
(EC)
IRI 0.28* 0.52** 0.49** 0.52** 0.43**
(PD)
IRI 0.31* 0.19 0.27* 0.26
(F)
ISS 0.85** 0.98** 0.72**
(IS)
OAS 0.94** 0.65**
Shame 0.72**
Guilt
* P < 0.05 
** P < 0.001
As eight correlations were carried out between the various measures of shame, guilt 
and empathy, the family wise error rate was adjusted accordingly, and these tests had 
to show significance beyond the 0.006 level (0.05 /8 = 0.006).
106As demonstrated in Table 2, it was found that Shame was correlated with the 
Personal Distress sub-scale of the IRI, and that this aspect of empathy was also 
correlated with guilt.  These correlations are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.  There 
were no other significant correlations.
Figure 2 Correlation between Personal Distress and Collapsed Shame
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107Figure 3 Correlation between Guilt and Personal Distress
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Grid measures
As elucidated in the Method section, external shame, guilt and empathy were 
measured directly, based on ratings of the element ‘myself now’ on those constructs. 
Internal shame, external shame and guilt were also measured indirectly, by 
measuring the distances in perceptions of pairs of elements: Internal shame was 
measured by calculating the distance between the elements ‘myself now’ and ‘ideal 
self; External shame was measured by calculating the distance between ‘myself 
now’ and ‘how others think I should be’; Guilt was measured by calculating the 
distance between ‘myself now’ and ‘myself before the offence’.
108Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics obtained for both the direct and indirect
grid measures of shame, guilt and empathy, for each group.
Table 3:  Descriptive statistics for grid measures
Direct  measure
Aspect being measured/group Median Minimum Maximum
External shame sex offenders 4 1 7
External shame non- sex 3 1 7
offenders
Guilt sex offenders 3 1 7
Guilt non-sex offenders 2.5 1 7
Empathy sex offenders 5 1 7
Empathy non-sex offenders 5 1 7
Indirect measure
Aspect being Measured/group Mean & standard Minimum Maximum
deviation
External shame sex offenders X = 0.32; sd = 0.23 0.00 0.89
External shame non- sex X = 0.29; sd = 0.21 0.01 0.87
offenders
Internal shame sex offenders X = 0.31; sd = 0.24 0.00 0.87
Internal shame non- sex X = 0.27; sd = 0.25 0.01 0.77
offenders
Guilt sex offenders X = 0.47; sd = 0.29 0.04 1.08
Guilt non-sex offenders X = 0.45; sd = 0.34 0.00 1.11
As indicated in Table 3, medians for direct measures of shame and guilt were similar 
between the groups (but marginally higher for sex offenders), and both groups had 
identical medians for self-ratings of empathy.  Means for all indirect measures were 
higher amongst sex offenders, and this difference was most pronounced for internal 
shame, followed by external shame and then guilt.
109Statistical Analysis
Monotonous constructs, outliers and transformations
For one sex offender, ratings for the direct measure of guilt were monotonous (each 
element was given the same rating of 1  on this construct, therefore the whole 
construct was removed).  For indirect measures, there were two outliers for external 
shame (both from the group of non-sex offenders), and three for internal shame (two 
from the sex-offender, and one from the non-sex offender group).  All outliers were 
removed from the data set.  External shame was slightly positively skewed for non­
sex offenders (skewness = 1.13) but this was corrected with a square root 
transformation (skewness = 0.19).
Group differences between direct arid measures of shame, guilt and empathy
In order to investigate differences between the groups in levels of external shame, 
guilt and empathy measured directly, Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out as the 
data were ordinal.  In total three such comparisons were executed.  The family wise 
error rate was modified accordingly to 0.016 for these comparisons (0.05 /3).  No 
significant differences were found between the groups on any of these variables 
(shame: z = .551, P = 0.582; guilt: z = .293, P = 0.77; empathy: z = .66, P = 0.51).
110Group differences between indirect srid measures of shame and guilt
Another one-factor ‘group’ (sex offenders Vs non-sex offenders) MANOVA was 
carried out with psychiatric diagnosis as a covariate, and indirect measures of 
internal shame, external shame and guilt as dependent variables.  The analysis 
revealed that there was neither a significant multivariate difference in internal shame, 
external shame and guilt between the two groups (F (3, 47) = 0.96, P = 0.42), nor any 
univariate differences between the groups on these variables.
Correlations between variables
Again, as it was predicted that the relationships between the self-conscious emotions 
would also exist for non-sex offenders, correlations were performed between the 
various measures of shame, guilt and empathy taking the entire sample as a whole.
An attempt was made to reduce the number of comparisons by collapsing the indirect 
measures of internal and external shame as these variables were highly correlated (r = 
0.67, n = 52,/? = 0.001), resulting in the variable ‘indirect shame’.
Table 4 presents correlations between shame, guilt and empathy as measured by the 
grid and questionnaires.
IllTable 4:  Correlations between grid and questionnaire measures of shame, guilt 
and empathy
12lnd
shame
Direct
13ext
shame
Direct
guilt
Ind
guilt
Empathy Shame OAS HDHQ IRI
(PT)
IRI (EC) IRI
(PD)
IRI
(F)
Ind 0.4** 0.32* 0.16 -0.16 0.18 0.11 0.82 -0.19 0.001 0.03 0.01
shame
Direct ext 0.46“ 0.23 -0.05 0.28* 0.26 0.21 -0.31* 0.06 0.19 -0.06
shame
Direct 0.36“ -0.02 0.29* 0.31* 0.35“ -0.22 -0.05 -0.24 -0.03
guilt
Ind guilt 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.21 0.01 0.25 0.22 0.02
Empathy 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.06 -0.28* 0.05
Shame 0.94** 0.70** 0.01 0.14 0.52“ 0.27*
OAS 0.64“ 0.07 0.16 0.49“ 0.19
HDHQ -0.06 0.09 0.34* 0.24
IRI (PT) 0.29* 0.11 0.49**
IRI (EC) 0.13 0.24
IRI (PD) 0.28*
IRI (F)
*  P<0.05 
“ P< 0.001
As illustrated in Table 4, no significant correlations were found between indirect 
shame and personal distress, as measured by a Pearson correlation.  For correlations 
between direct shame and empathy, empathy and guilt, and direct shame and 
personal distress, Spearman’s rho correlations were performed, and the family-wise 
error rate was adjusted to 0.01 (0.05 /5).  As can be seen in Table 4, no significant 
correlations were found between any grid measures of shame and empathy.
12 Ind = Indirect
13 Ext = External
112Correlations between questionnaire and grid measures of shame, suilt and empathy
One Pearson and seven Spearman correlations were carried out to correlate the 
questionnaire measures of shame, guilt and empathy with grid measures of these 
same concepts, and the family-wise error rate was appropriately adjusted to 0.007 for 
the non-parametric correlations (0.05/7).  To reduce the number of correlations, the 
collapsed variables ‘direct shame’ and ‘indirect shame’ were used, rather than 
analyzing internal and external shame separately as measured by questionnaires, and 
indirectly from the grid.  Correlations between the various questionnaire and grid 
measures can also be seen in Table 4.
As illustrated in Table 4, no significant correlations were found between the various 
shame measures (Indirect shame and collapsed shame; OAS and direct external 
shame).  Neither were there any significant correlations between the guilt subscale of 
the HDHQ and the indirect measure of guilt from the grid, although for direct guilt 
and the guilt subscale of the HDHQ, significance was almost achieved {p = 0.008). 
There were no significant correlations between empathy as measured by the grid and 
IRI (PD), or between empathy measured by the grid and any questionnaire measures 
of empathy.
113Additional information obtained from grid
Two additional measures were taken from the repertory grid: Tightness of 
construing and distance of the self from an offender considered likely to commit a 
similar crime (‘dissociation’).  These data are presented in Table 5.
Table 5:  Descriptive statistics for tightness of construing and dissociation
Aspect being Measured/group Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Tightness sex offenders 73.08 9.11 51.61 89.84
Tightness non-sex offenders 69.46 11.36 43.68 88.81
Dissociation sex offenders 0.96 0.47 0.09 1.75
Dissociation non-sex offenders 0.80 0.62 0.08 2.61
As illustrated in Table 5, means for both tightness and dissociation were slightly 
higher for sex-offenders.  Two independent samples t-tests were carried out to look 
at group differences on these variables.  The family-wise error rate was modified 
accordingly (0.05/2 = 0.025), but no significant differences were found between the 
groups for either variable (t(53) = 1.30, p = 0.20 for tightness; t(54) = 1.06, p = 0.29 
for dissociation).
Case example
In order to illustrate the value of repertory grids as a tool that can be used in the 
assessment of sex offenders, this section will discuss a case example.
114Participant number 11 was a 24-year old white man, with a history of sexual abuse, 
currently serving a prison sentence for the rape of an adult female.  There were 
themes of negative emotion and aggression apparent in his elicited constructs (e.g. 
Feel bad; Angry; Hated; Evil; Dangerous).  This participant’s ratings were often 
polarized, indicating that he has a unidimensional view of the world and thinks in 
dichotomous terms (e.g. Loyal-disloyal; Protective-unprotective), with little 
flexibility.  A large proportion of the variance (67.83%) was accounted for by the 
first component, further indicating tightness of construing as features of this 
individual’s construct system.  The correlation between shame and empathy was 
negative (-0.61).  That these two concepts are seen as dissimilar is confirmed by the 
substantial distance of 1.90 between empathy and shame, and is graphically 
illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4:  Plot  for Participant no.  11
feel bad 
keeping self to self
evil' 
angry 
hated . 
shame - 
guilt 
dangerous
Comp 2
• self  before offence 
sex offender
♦ myself now
self after offence
father
------
others
* sictim
friendly
• ideal self
mother 
• sibling
-Comp 1—
_ forgiving 
w aijg^nder
♦ so:
* someone I dis
meone
' protective
^ happy
115Figure 4 plots loadings of elements and constructs on the first principal component, 
represented by the horizontal axis, against those on the second, represented by the 
vertical axis.
The plot reveals an interesting picture.  The element ‘others’ (how other people think 
I should be) is viewed as closer to ‘ideal self than ‘myself now’, indicating that this 
man’s ideal self and his perception of what others expect of him, are more similar 
(measured as 0.59) to each other than is his present view of himself to his ideal self. 
The large distance (1.62), as indicated above, between ‘ideal self’ and ‘myself now’ 
(representing internal shame) in Figure 4 depicts this distance graphically.  The small 
distance (0.32) between ‘myself now’ and ‘sex offender’ indicates that he continues 
to see himself as a sex offender, which would be crucial information in the 
formulation of this man’s difficulties and problem behaviour, having important 
implications for treatment and predicting his future behaviour.
The plot illustrates that ‘victim’ and ‘others’ do not load heavily on Component 1, 
whereas most of  the remaining elements (excluding ‘father’) are described in some 
way by this component.  Based on the plot, Participant no. 11 does not have a clear 
view of his victim, or of how other people think he should be, suggesting that neither 
of these two elements are very salient to him.  Additional evidence for this 
hypothesis could be the frequent mid-point ratings evident on his original grid for 
constructs relating to these elements.  ‘Victim’ is the only element strongly 
associated with Component 2 rather than Component 1, implying that she is viewed
116by this sex offender as different to most of the other elements in this man’s construct 
system.  Only 7.97% of the variance is accounted for by Component 2.
Consistency between grid measures and questionnaire measures is reflected in a high 
level of internal shame (1.62) as measured indirectly by the grid, as well as a high 
score on the questionnaire measure of internal shame (87), measured by the ISS.
DISCUSSION
This study set out to investigate the role of shame in sex offenders.  It was 
hypothesized that shame would be negatively correlated with empathy, and that guilt 
would be positively correlated with empathy.  It was also expected that shame and 
personal distress would be positively correlated.  Differences were not predicted 
between sex offenders and non-sex offenders in levels of other-oriented empathy, but 
higher external shame and lower internal shame were anticipated amongst sex 
offenders.  Finally, it was expected that sex offenders with no histories of sexual 
abuse would be more likely to experience guilt than those with previous histories of 
abuse.
This study found that sex offenders had significantly higher levels of empathic 
concern compared to non-sex offenders, and that personal distress was significantly 
correlated with both guilt and shame amongst the entire sample of offenders, using 
questionnaire measures.  There were no other significant findings.
117As previously discussed, the Empathic Concern scale of the IRI assesses the extent to 
which respondents experience other-oriented feelings of compassion and concern 
(Davis, 1980; Tangney and Dearing, 2002).  A higher level of empathic concern 
among sex offenders as compared to non-sex offenders is a curious finding.  One 
might speculate that an individual who behaves in a sexually intrusive and 
domineering manner towards another human being would be no more aware of, 
considerate or concerned for the well-being of other people than a person who 
engages in acquisitive or drug-related crime (which in this study amounted to 
approximately half of the non-sex offender sample).  The literature in the area of 
empathy and sex offending broadly indicates that sex offenders do not differ 
significantly from non-sex offenders in empathy levels generally, but that victim- 
specific empathy may be impaired, particularly amongst child sex offenders (e.g. 
Finklehor, 1986; Marshall, Hudson, Jones and Fernandez, 1995) and hence this 
finding is inconsistent with the literature overall.
It is possible that this emotional aspect of empathy really was higher amongst sex 
offenders in this study, and that a greater sensitivity and attunement to the emotional 
world of another person exists for sex offenders in relation to non-sex offenders. 
Higher empathy may be a helpful quality in the securing of victims through the 
grooming process, and may genuinely be raised in some sex offenders, particularly 
child sex offenders.  Indeed, Tierney and McCabe (2001) found, in their evaluation 
of measures used for sex offenders, that child sex offenders yielded significantly 
higher scores on a measure of general empathy (the Mehrabian and Epstein Empathy 
Scale) compared to adult sex offenders (but not compared to non-sex offenders). 
Conversely, and in line with much of the literature concerning empathy in this
118population, child sex offenders demonstrated deficiencies in empathy for victims of 
child sexual abuse.  Tierney and McCabe (2001) consequently questioned the value 
of addressing general empathy amongst child sex offenders, and suggested that 
general empathy and issue-specific empathy may be different constructs.  However, 
as the hypothesis regarding the inverse relationship between shame and empathy 
concerns dispositional responding, in the present study it appeared logical to measure 
general empathy, rather than the sort that is victim or issue-specific.  However, the 
possibility remains that, with more than a third of the sex offending sample in the 
present study being classified as child sex offenders, these participants yielded 
relatively higher scores compared to adult offenders (as a minority of studies have 
previously found) and increased the average score of sex offenders overall, creating a 
statistically significant difference.  Future studies may benefit from not mixing adult 
and child sex offenders together as a group, as evidence suggests that child sex 
offenders may be a more distinct subgroup who share many similarities with, but 
who may also have some important differences in comparison to adult sex offenders 
(e.g. Romans, Martin, Anderson, O’Shea and Mullen, 1996; Hilton, 1993; Freund 
and Kuban, 1993; Howells, 1979).
It might be the case that some sex offenders have higher empathy, and that their 
superior empathic concern is misguided and misused, as has been suggested 
regarding Adolf Hitler and his capacity to empathise with others (Gordo, 2006). 
However, significantly higher empathy amongst sex offenders is a rare finding in the 
literature, and difficult to explain.
119A possibility is that sex offenders demonstrated a significantly higher display of 
empathic concern but this was in fact specious.  Perhaps sex offenders felt more of a 
need to demonstrate greater empathy to the female researcher due to a multitude of 
factors, including social desirability, and habitual behaviour towards young women. 
Moriarty et. al’s (2001) research suggests that adolescent sex offenders had lower 
empathic concern as measured by the IRI than the adult sex offenders in the present 
study, and the non-sex offenders in the present study had similar levels of empathic 
concern to the adolescent sex offenders.  The sex offenders’ levels of empathic 
concern in the present study were actually more consistent with empathic concern 
levels of medical students as reported by Bellini and Shea (2005) who used the IRI to 
measure empathy.  A possible explanation for this is that there is no difference in 
empathy levels, generally, between sex offenders and non-sex offenders, in line with 
recent thinking (Fernandez, Marshall, Lightbody and O’Sullivan, 1999; Fernandez 
and Marshall [as cited in Marshall, Hamilton and Fernandez, 2000]; Marshall, 
Champagne, Brown and Miller, 1997), and that these levels are low in relation to 
medical students (a population that might be considered especially empathic) but that 
as sex offenders grow in age and develop in experience, they learn to feign empathy. 
In so doing, they may project an image of a highly empathic individual, similar to the 
type of impression that may be exuded by the kind of person who dedicates their life 
to the concern and well-being of others.  This would be consistent with the position 
taken by Hilton (1993), who challenged the practice of empathy training in sex 
offenders, raising concern that such treatment programs may merely be teaching sex 
offenders to fake and speak the language of empathy, but not to have a genuine 
understanding of it.
120Interestingly, both groups in the present study scored the same, overall, on empathy 
measured directly by the grid.  This inconsistency amongst different measures of the 
same phenomenon is likely to be due to the different ways of defining empathy.  The 
grid measure of empathy was based on only one question, and related more to the 
cognitive rather than emotional aspects of empathy.  The more cognitive components 
of empathy measured by the questionnaire were in fact similar between groups.
As predicted, it was found that Personal Distress was significantly positively 
correlated with shame amongst the sample as a whole.  This finding can be 
interpreted in terms of Tangey and Dearing’s (2002) suggestion that shame-prone 
individuals are more vulnerable to “egoistic drift”, in that they become distracted by 
their own emotional response when faced with a distressed other, rather than 
maintaining a focus on the other’s needs.  Tangney and Dearing (2002) report that 
this pattern has been found amongst individuals from many walks of life (e.g. 
Tangney, 1991), and the present study may widen the population that this association 
might be appropriately applied to.
This study also found a significant positive association between Personal Distress 
and Guilt.  This relationship is difficult to justify theoretically as it would not be 
expected that Personal Distress, a self-oriented experience, would be associated 
particularly with the other-oriented nature of guilt (Tangey and Dearing, 2002). 
However, some research has demonstrated a positive correlation between guilt and 
personal distress (e.g. Tangney, 1991), even though these inconsistencies have not 
been well addressed.  A potential explanation for this positive relationship is that 
personal distress does not necessarily follow a straight trajectory towards shame, but
121might act as a kind of relay station, where either guilt or shame could be the resultant 
emotional experience, depending on various factors.  Tangney and Dearing’s (2002) 
conceptualization of shame-fused guilt might be linked to the relationship between 
personal distress and guilt.  This is where guilt becomes maladaptive further to 
becoming fused with shame, with the shame element of this potent emotional 
concoction causing difficulty for the person. Possibly, one of the deciding factors in 
whether shame or guilt occurs in an individual following a transgression is that 
individual’s response to personal distress.  It is conceivable that the personal distress 
response creates a pathway to shame through its self-oriented focus which may 
cultivate global cognitions about the self and develop into shame-fused guilt or pure 
shame.  Building on Tangney and Dearing’s idea of shame-fused guilt, it may be that 
personal distress creates a bridge to shame or shame-fused guilt by setting off global 
attributions about the self.  Alternatively, an individual experiencing personal 
distress and egoistic drift might drift their attention back from the self to the 
distressed other, allowing guilt and consequently empathy to spawn.  This hypothesis 
is diagrammatically illustrated in Figure 5 (see Appendices).  These ideas are simply 
speculative, but could become an area worthy of further empirical investigation.
One possibility is that both these significant associations are spurious findings, and a 
mere result of the various demand characteristics and social desirability effects that 
might have occurred in the dynamic between the male offenders and female 
researcher.
It was predicted, in line with an emerging finding amongst various populations 
(Tangney, 1991, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c [as cited in Tangney and Dearing,
1222002]; Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, Gramzow and Fletcher [1991, as cited in 
Tangney and Dearing, 2002]), that shame and empathy would be inversely related, 
and that empathy and guilt would be positively correlated.  No such relationships 
were found in this study.  One possibility for this is that these inter-relationships do 
not exist for sex offenders.  The pattern of results in previous studies is promising, 
especially with regards to guilt and empathy, but the link between shame, guilt and 
empathy is not an extremely consistent observation (e.g. Tangney, 1991).  Perhaps in 
some populations the proposed relationship between the self-conscious emotions 
does not exist, or operates quite differently.  Much of the research in this area has 
involved American students, and other populations that might be rather different to 
offending populations.  One could speculate that the emerging finding regarding 
shame, guilt and empathy is less likely to be generalizable to populations of 
offenders, whose emotions may interact in ways that are extraordinary in comparison 
to non-offending populations.  Wright (2005) investigated self-conscious emotions 
within a sample of British convicted offenders, and her findings did not support the 
existence of these emotional inter-relationships.
Alternatively, the inverse relationship between shame and empathy may only be 
detected if some but not other measures of these emotions are used.  Support for this 
idea comes from Tangney’s (1991) studies, where the inverse relationship between 
shame and empathy was not evident when the IRI was used, but was clearly present 
when an alternative measure of empathy was utilised.  This illuminates the need for 
greater consistency between measures of the same phenomena, and may be a factor 
in this relationship not being found in the present study.
123It could be argued that the participants in this study were not responding honestly, 
particularly about the emotional aspect of empathy, and were selecting answers that 
would appear socially desirable; Hence a true test of these hypotheses may not have 
been possible in this study.  A future, similar study might be improved by including a 
measure of social desirability (as discussed below).
It was predicted that there would be significantly higher external and lower internal 
shame among sex offenders as compared to non-sex offenders.  There were no 
significant results for these variables, and both types of offender demonstrated 
proclivities towards higher internal shame.  This may be a further indication that 
participants in this study were responding according to a socially desirable response 
set.  Responses indicating high internal shame may have been considered by 
offenders to be more socially desirable in the eyes of the researcher.
This study did not find that shame was a significant feature of sex offenders 
compared to other types of offender.  There may have been a myriad of reasons for 
this as is being addressed in this paper, nevertheless, it is interesting to reflect on the 
possible clinical implications had shame been found to be important for these men.
It would seem that de-constructing this powerful and painful emotion might be a 
helpful step in their rehabilitation.  As discussed, shame encompasses an intense self­
focus, and may inhibit a person’s capacity to take the position of and vicariously 
experience the emotions of another.  Consequently, the welfare of others is difficult 
for shame-prone individuals to appreciate.  As recommended by Bumby et. al 
(1999), the treatment of sex offenders may be more successful if shame is de­
emphasised and guilt is encouraged.  This would allow the self-focus of shame to be
124diluted, responsibility for one’s behaviour and its effects on others to be considered, 
and possibly the enhancement of empathy.
It was not possible to assess the impact of previous sexual abuse amongst sex 
offenders on guilt, as not enough participants admitted to having ever experienced 
sexual abuse to allow statistical analysis.  Previous research has indicated the 
prevalence of childhood sexual victimization to be at least twice the rate that was 
found in this study (Hanson and Slater, 1988; Jacobson, 1989).  It is possible that this 
may also have been due to the impression that the men in this study were trying to 
create for the researcher.  It is generally agreed that a risk factor for becoming a 
perpetrator is a history of previous victimisation (Glasser and Kolvin, 2001), 
particularly amongst paedophiles, and the relatively small number of sex offenders, 
and also non-sex offenders, who admitted to having been sexually abused in this 
study suggests that the given responses to the question of whether or not they had 
been abused were not a true reflection of the actual incidence of childhood sexual 
abuse.  Some studies raise concerns that social desirability, with regards to admission 
of previous sexual victimization, is manifested in sex offenders over-reporting their 
histories of adverse childhood experiences such as sexual abuse (e.g. Hindman,
1988), in order that perpetrators can explain their abusive behaviours and elicit 
sympathy from the researcher.  Other studies did not find support for this (e.g. Lee, 
Jackson, Pattison and Ward, 2002).  However, as outlined below, in this study there 
appeared to be under-reporting of previous sexual victimization amongst both sex 
offenders and non-sex offenders.  It is possible that a number of sex offenders may 
not have wanted the researcher to think that that they were in fact perpetrators. 
Therefore it may follow that under-reporting of childhood victimization might occur
125for sex offenders.  For non-sex offenders, it is possible that previous victimization 
was not often admitted due to the concern of appearing vulnerable and un-manly in 
the eyes of the researcher.
It was also anticipated that questionnaire measures of shame, guilt and empathy 
would be significantly correlated with repertory grid measures of the same variables. 
This was not found in the present study, and may have been due to variations in 
definitions of variables between the types of measures. For example, guilt in PCT 
terms was measured indirectly by the grid through calculating the distance between 
‘myself now’ and ‘myself before the offence’, whereas the guilt sub-scale of the 
HDHQ focuses on self-judgement of previous bad behaviour, as opposed to 
dislodgement from one’s core role.
Previous research amongst the general population indicates a relationship between 
the variables measured in this study, although generally these relationships were not 
found in the present study.  It is proposed that this was not necessarily due to these 
relationships not existing amongst these variables within the present population, but 
to the effects of a socially desirable response set and the rather complicated dynamics 
created between the male offenders and female researcher.
The tendency to present oneself positively in the completion of self-report measures 
has been termed socially desirable responding (Paulhaus, 1998). Much research 
indicates that offenders in general tend to respond to self-report measures dishonestly 
(e.g. Holden, Kroner, Fekken and Popham, 1992).  Tierney and McCabe (2001) 
found that violent offenders who yielded high scores on a measure of impression
126management emitted significantly lower antisocial attitudes.  They stressed that the 
transparency of questionnaire items and the impact of social desirability on 
responding are generally considered serious problems when assessing sex offenders. 
Abel, Becker, Blanchard and Mavissakalian (1975) found in their investigations of 
sex offenders that a number of participants faked good responses. Hence, whether the 
responses of sex offenders reflect their genuine feelings, or are expressions of how 
they wish to be perceived, is questionable.
If socially desirable responding was the main factor behind many of the findings in 
this study, then researchers and clinicians must question the value of using self-report 
measures with forensic populations.  Anecdotal evidence lends support to the 
possibility that there may really have been high levels of external shame amongst this 
sample of sex offenders.  Several men who had committed sexual offences against 
children independently asked the researcher to enter their cell to see pictures that 
they had drawn (such as, of Jesus Christ).  It was difficult not to be struck by the 
prominent posters of female adult pornography on these sex offenders’ walls, and it 
is plausible that the invitations to view artistic creations were pretexts upon which to 
draw the researcher in to their cells, where what may be considered ordinary and 
relatively acceptable sexual preferences could be explicitly demonstrated, possibly in 
the hope that the researcher may consider the offender to now have (or to have 
always had) acceptable sexual tendencies.  Further anecdotal evidence for the 
presence of high external shame amongst sex offenders comes from the observation 
that many convicted sex offenders explicitly denied their offences (as has been found 
to be a position commonly taken amongst sex offenders, e.g. Birgisson, 1996), and
127one sex offender approached the researcher at a later point and asked her if she 
judged him in a negative way.
Future studies should consider employing a social desirability scale or a lie scale, 
such as the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne and Marlowe,
1960), or the Paulhus Deception Scale (Paulhaus, 1998) to allow the assessment of 
social desirability, honesty of responses and to control for untrue responses.  An 
interesting comparison might be responses to measures of shame, guilt and empathy 
between two groups of sex offenders; those subjected to a lie detection examination 
(i.e. polygraph), and those who are not.  The belief that dishonest responses could be 
detected may discourage untrue responses and therefore provide a more accurate 
snapshot of the interactions between self-conscious emotions among sex offenders.
It may also be more appropriate that in future studies of this sort the interviews are 
conducted by male researchers, to potentially lessen the effects of social desirability, 
and that target questions are merged within more neutral questions, to make what is 
being investigated less obvious.  The indirect grid measures appear to have lower 
face validity than the questionnaire measures, and perhaps building on this technique 
by adding an indirect measure of empathy to the grid (e.g. as has been employed by 
Widom, 1976, by defining empathy as accurate construing of another person’s 
constructions), and combining this technique with more subtle assessments would be 
a more valid way of measuring shame, guilt and empathy amongst offenders.
Clinicians and researchers working with offenders may need to concentrate on 
expanding their repertoire of approaches to measurement, and develop less
128transparent assessment tools that are not so vulnerable to impression management, 
and that can detect emotions without asking about them directly.  These could take 
the form of performance-based measures, which might be less vulnerable to social 
desirability than self-report measures.  Serin and Mailloux (2003) describe the use of 
a performance-based measure of empathy, incorporating the work of Hanson and 
Scott (1995).  Such tests may be less vulnerable to faking than self-report measures, 
and might provide more valid assessments of the phenomena under investigation.
There is evidence for the validity and reliability of all of the measures used in the 
present study, as outlined in the Method section.  However, as with most measures of 
emotional and psychological constructs, improvement would be possible and 
desirable.
The Internalised Shame Scale (ISS), which was used in this study to measure internal 
shame, has been found to correlate positively with measures of self esteem (Cook, 
1991).  This has the obvious problem of questionable validity, and raises the 
possibility that what was in fact being measured in this study was self esteem and not 
internal shame, or perhaps a combination of several self-conscious emotions.  On 
balance, perhaps it is difficult to separate shame and self-esteem because they have a 
complex relationship, and may operate in unison.  The blurring of definitions of self­
esteem and internal shame is also reflected in the Personal Construct Psychology 
literature, where the distance between the self and the ideal self (which, in the 
present study was used as a measure of internal shame), is sometimes understood as a 
measure of self-esteem (e.g. Winter, 1992).
129A further problem with the use of the ISS in this study as a measure of internal 
shame is that some of the items in the ISS appear to relate to external shame.  Hence, 
if shame was being measured by this scale in the present study, it may not have been 
purely internal.  However, one of the aims of this research was to distinguish internal 
from external shame, and there is little choice of instruments for assessing external 
shame.  Perhaps a future study of this sort could involve constructing and utilizing 
new questionnaire measures of internal and external shame.  It may be the case, with 
the relatively recent advent of the distinction between external and internal shame, 
that measures of these dimensions of shame might initially suffer from similar 
confusion apparent in early measures of guilt and shame.
The guilt subscale of the Hostility and Direction of Hostility questionnaire (HDHQ; 
Caine, Foulds and Hope, 1967) includes a small number of items that appear to relate 
to shame.  As mentioned, this blurring of definitions of shame and guilt is 
characteristic of older measures, which reflects the changing definitions of such 
emotions over time.  The validity of this measure may be further questionable when 
considering the method used in the validation of this instrument (criterion groups;
See Method section), which involved ordering various clinical subgroups on the 
subtests.  Melancholics yielded the highest scores for the guilt subscale, and mentally 
healthy individuals attained the lowest scores, with various other classifications in 
between.  Evidence of this quality appears presumptuous, as, for instance, ‘normal’ 
or as yet undiagnosed individuals may experience and respond to transgressions with 
extreme guilt.  Perhaps future similar studies should investigate more recent 
instruments that measure guilt, such as the Guilt Inventory (Kugler and Jones, 1992), 
as potentially more valid measures of guilt.
130Finally, there are many advantages to the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis 
1980; used in this study to measure empathy) such as the fact that it contains a 
separate scale for personal distress.  However, it has been argued by some 
investigators (e.g. Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen and David, 2004) that 
personal distress is not pure empathy.  So, whilst it is an extremely important concept 
to isolate, one view is that it is perhaps misplaced in an instrument that claims to 
measure empathy.  The IRI has also been found to correlate significantly with 
measures of impression management, and to have no relationship to performance- 
based empathy measures (Serrin and Mailloux, 2003).  This supports the suggestion 
that in the present study, the assessment of empathic concern may have in fact 
become an assessment of social desirability.  Future studies might consider the use of 
alternative empathy measures, such as the Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright, 2003), and combining them with performance-based measures.
A limitation of this study was also that there was substantial heterogeneity within the 
sample.  A particular problem was that significantly more sex offenders had 
psychiatric diagnoses compared to non-sex offenders.  This could have implications 
for the real root of any between-group differences if found in future studies; As such 
differences could be due to the sequela of schizophrenia and other forms of mental 
illness prevalent amongst some sex offenders.  One possibility might be that shame is 
the seed of psychopathology.  Its association with mental illness appears to be broad 
in scope (e.g. Linehan, 1993; Frank, 1991; Andrews, 1995) and it might be feasible 
that shame proneness is in fact a precursor to or a risk factor for poor mental health. 
Due to the potential interaction between shame and mental illness, future studies
131might be improved if sex offenders from special hospital, who are likely to be 
diagnosed with a serious mental illness, are excluded from participation.
Finally, given the prevalence of undiagnosed psychopathy in forensic populations 
(e.g. Bland, Newman, Dyck and Om, 1990), and the association of psychopathy with 
empathy deficits (Anckarsater, 2005), if this study were to be repeated in some form 
it may be wise to screen for psychopathy, perhaps by using the Hare psychopathy 
checklist-revised (Hare, 1991) and exclude psychopaths from participating.  Self- 
conscious emotions may operate rather differently in this population and confound 
the variables under investigation.  It might be advisable to split the research 
interview into two sessions if this measure was included, as the original test battery 
took a rather long time to complete.
Overall, the main hypotheses of this study were not supported, and the one that was 
(correlation between personal distress and shame) may have been a consequence of 
socially desirable responding.  This makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions 
directly from the research with regards to the hypotheses under investigation, or 
possible clinical implications.  However it seems highly important that self conscious 
emotions in sex offenders are better understood and that more research is generated 
within this area.  Clarification of the role of shame and its relationship to other 
emotions, such as personal distress is very much needed, and further research might 
also shed light on the maintenance of discrete sexual attacks.  As suggested by 
Tangney (1991), shame-prone individuals may experience greater difficulty if they 
feel responsible for the other person’s distress.  "This could indicate a vicious circle 
for sex offenders, where negative affect such as shame, is an antecedent to sexual
132offending, and where the knowledge that one is responsible for their victim’s distress 
exacerbates feelings of personal distress and shame.  Negative affect can foster anger 
and hostility (Berkowitz, 1989); Emotions that have been found to play a significant 
role in sexual aggression (McKibben, Proulx, and Lusignan, 1994).  The specific 
offending situation might be fertile ground for the complex interactions of self- 
conscious emotions, primary emotions and cognitive appraisals in sex offenders.
Although the grid measures did not reveal group differences, consideration of an 
individual grid revealed interesting themes within that participant’s construct system, 
and was informative as to his style and flexibility of construing, suggesting 
(consistent with previous literature, e.g. Houston, 1998; Howells, 1979) the possible 
utility of the grid as an idiographic measure with this population.
CONCLUSION
The present study found significantly higher levels of empathic concern among sex 
offenders than non-sex offenders, and also significant positive correlations between 
personal distress and shame, as well as personal distress and guilt, within this sample 
overall.  These findings have been interpreted in the context of the available 
literature, and findings in the present research that have not been addressed in the 
literature have been reflected on.  However, a possible explanation for the findings 
overall, supported by anecdotal evidence, is that the offenders in this study were 
trying to present themselves positively in the eyes of the researcher, and ironically, 
this may be a finding in itself, indicating the possible prevalence of external shame, 
particularly amongst sex offenders in this study.  Recommendations for future
133studies have been made, and suggestions include employing more subtle methods for 
assessing emotions in this population, a lie scale for detecting dishonesty in 
responses, and also a male researcher to lessen the effects of social desirability.
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147PART 3: CRITICAL APPRAISAL
148ABSTRACT
This  paper will  reflect on  the  process  of having carried  out a  study investigating 
emotions in sex offenders, and will critique the study.  The first part will deal with 
methodological  aspects  of  the  research  process  including  self-report,  social 
desirability, the scientific method, the dynamic between the female researcher and 
male participants,  sampling issues and use of data.  The latter part of this critical 
appraisal will consider the attitude of staff to sex offenders in hospital as compared 
to those in prison.
Methodology
Self-report is  the most common method used in clinical psychology, and there are 
many advantages to using self-report questionnaires and conducting interviews, such 
as increasing the chances that all the questions will be understood and answered, and 
rather  obviously,  acquiring  personal  information  directly  from  the  respondent. 
However, there are numerous associated problems of validity (Barker, Pistrang and 
Elliot, 2002) with the self-report method.
Honesty  in  responding  is  not  guaranteed,  and,  as  may  have  been  evident  in  the 
present  research,  may  not  be  very  likely  in  some  situations.  People  may  be 
disguising the truth for various reasons, including to deceive either themselves and/or 
the experimenter, thus, perhaps with the conscious or unconscious attempt to avoid 
feelings  of internal  or external  shame.  This  tendency to  respond  untruthfully  to 
questions  that threaten  an individual’s  self-presentation  is  a diffuse  and  prevalent
149problem in psychology and other fields (Schaeffer, 2000), and particularly in forensic 
settings (Holden, Kroner, Fekken and Popham, 1992).
In  this  research  in  particular,  the  issue  of  social  desirability  appeared  to  be 
prominent,  although  it  should  be  noted  that  concern  over  the  impression  one  is 
creating for others is ubiquitous (see Leahy,  1996).  There was a strong sense that 
sex offenders were eager to impress the researcher.  Some individuals went to great 
lengths  to  manage  and  present themselves  in  ways  that were,  possibly from  their 
perspectives, acceptable or attractive.  This was an issue both in hospital and prison.
For example in hospital, one sex offender attended the interview in a full dress suit, 
including  a  dress  shirt,  bow  tie,  top  hat  and  tails.  This  was  a  patient  who  the 
researcher had seen on the ward on occasion (but who had not been aware of her), 
prior to the research interview.  During the interview the researcher noted that the 
patient’s accent had changed somewhat to a rather ‘posh’  one.  Being a little struck 
by this man’s appearance, the researcher asked him if he was going somewhere that 
day, and he explained that he had dressed in this manner for the research interview. 
It was assumed that the change in accent was also for this purpose (but for obvious 
reasons this was not questioned).
In  prison,  several  men who had committed  sexual offences  against children  made 
attempts to draw the relatively young, female researcher into their cells to show her 
some  kind  of product  of their  imaginations,  such  as  pictures  they  had  drawn  or 
material  they  had  written.  These  men  also  had  rather  explicit  female  adult 
pornography on their walls.  To the researcher at the time this felt as though what
150was being communicated was the message that they were no longer, or never had 
been, paedophiles or child molesters, as evidenced by their ‘normal’ and/or ‘healthy’ 
sexual interests in female adults.  This may have been an indication of the potentially 
high levels of external shame present within this population.
Another  possibility  is  that  in  fact  what  they  wanted  was  to  see  the  researcher’s 
reaction to such graphic and potentially offensive material, or that drawing a young 
woman into their cells was part of a fantasy that did not materialise.  Similarly, such 
behaviour may have been an attempt at redressing the power balance that may have 
been perceived, such as that created by the researcher having been dressed smartly, 
holding a brief case, with keys attached to her belt.  This may have been exacerbated 
by the way that the researcher was treated by Prison Officers; With deference and as 
though she was in a high status position in a setting that was almost military and that 
operated within a strong hierarchical structure.  Possibly, leading the researcher into 
their cells, decorated with images of women in what could be described as abject and 
demeaning  positions,  somehow  returned  a  degree  of  power  back  to  these  sex 
offenders,  who  may  have  felt  rather  powerless  under  the  aforementioned 
circumstances.
These reflections highlight that the ways in which sex offenders, both in hospital and 
prison, responded in this research, would have been influenced by their perceptions 
of the researcher’s view of them, and their feelings towards the researcher, as well as 
or as opposed to the way things really were.  This dynamic has implications for, not 
only the present research in particular, but also research using self-report methods in 
general, and in addition female staff working with male sex offenders.
151With regards to the present research, there are reasons to believe that responses were 
dishonest, and that the results demonstrating significantly higher empathy amongst 
sex offenders should not necessarily be taken at face value, as these men might have 
been responding according to a socially desirable response set.  Although having a 
female researcher had some definite advantages in working with this sample such as 
ease of recruiting, the disadvantages included dishonesty of responding, resulting in a 
data  set  that  most  probably  was  not  in  fact  a  true  reflection  of what  was  being 
measured.  Future studies using male sex offenders might yield more valid data if the 
researcher was male (and for many male sex offenders potentially less intimidating) 
and if the measures  used were more subtle.  These could take the form  of further 
measures  from  the  grid,  and  also  performance-based  measures  (e.g.  Serin  and 
Mailloux,  2003;  Hanson  and  Scott,  1995).  It  is  difficult  to  anticipate  what 
appropriate  performance-based  measures  of self-conscious  emotions  might  entail, 
and it would be expected that there might be great difficulties with the validity and 
reliability of such measures, but perhaps it is helpful to identify this  as an area in 
much need of further investigation.
In terms of self-report methods in general, it is important to consider that this is an 
extremely  common  and  popular  method  of  gathering  data  across  social  sciences 
(Barker, Pistrang and Elliot, 2002).  Therefore, numerous research findings discussed 
in  the literature  are  based  on data gathered  in  this  way.  As  outlined  by Barker, 
Pistrang  and  Elliot  (2002),  both  psychoanalysts  and  social  psychologists  express 
doubts  about  self-report  methods.  Psychoanalysts  have  little  regard  for  such 
methods, as conscious self-knowledge is considered limited, with important feelings
152existing unconsciously and being guarded by defence mechanisms such as denial or 
repression.  Social  psychologists  consider  that  biases  exist  that  cloud  peoples’ 
judgement, such as self-serving biases: The tendency to take credit for success and 
deny responsibility for failure (Fiske and Taylor,  1991; Barker, Pistrang and Elliot, 
2002).  It is plausible that both defences and biases come into play in the collection 
of data via self-report methods.
A major advantage to gaining self-report data via standardised questionnaires is that 
the questions are standardised.  Fitting with the scientific method, this should allow 
studies  to  be  replicated  (Popper,  1959)  because  the measures  used  are  the  same. 
Rigorous  methods  are  employed  when  scientific  research  is  conducted  with  the 
intention that bias and errors are minimised, allowing clear conclusions to be drawn 
(Barker, Pistrang and Elliot, 2002).
This study is  a good example of how the scientific method can be threatened and 
jeopardised depending on factors such as the gender of the researcher.  It is plausible 
that quite different results might have been obtained if the researcher conducting the 
interviews in this study was male.  Replication is a prerequisite to valid and reliable 
scientific  research,  but as  this  study has exemplified,  other factors  may  affect the 
replicability of findings even if standardised measures are used.
Clearly,  there  are  some  significant  disadvantages  to  gathering  self-report  data. 
However,  this does  not debunk the self-report method  overall,  but highlights  that 
self-report data would be more or less appropriate in certain settings.  On reflection, 
gathering information via self-report may not have been the best-suited method to
153have applied in the present study, and perhaps more consideration should have been 
given to this issue at the planning and designing stage of this research.
The  behaviour  of  both  groups  of  men  was  rather  notable.  As  mentioned,  sex 
offenders appeared enthusiastic to impress the researcher.  Most non-sex offenders 
behaved in ways that indicated that they were attracted to the researcher.  They went 
to great lengths to make themselves available to participate, missed activities such as 
exercise,  ate  meals  incredibly quickly so  that  the  researcher  wouldn’t  be waiting 
around and potentially interview somebody else, formed a queuing system amongst 
themselves, provided the researcher with scraps of paper detailing their identification 
and  location  whilst  passing  her  on  the  wing  so  that  she  might  locate  them  and 
interview them, and often approached her in a flirtatious manner.  By the time data 
collection was complete, the researcher was left with a list of men who requested 
with enthusiasm to participate in the study.
Male  prisons  are  predominantly  male  environments,  with  a  relatively  small 
proportion  of  female  staff  who  have  direct  contact  with  inmates.  The  non-sex 
offenders appeared to be highly motivated to participate in the study and one reason 
for  this  could  have  been  that  being  in  a  room  alone  with  a  young  woman  was 
something to be fought for as they had been deprived of such contact for a length of 
time.  It was of interest that this display of flirtatious behaviour subsided once the 
interview began, which suggests that it may have been due to the machismo present 
on the prison wings.  Once the private research interview had commenced and there 
was no audience of fellow inmates to impress, behaviour was more neutral.  Boyd 
and Grant (2005) found that the only difference in male inmates’ perceptions of male
154and female Prison Officers was that female staff were viewed as more professional. 
In  the  present  study,  the  behaviour  of  inmates  generally  appeared  much  more 
boundaried  and  professional  during  the  private  research  interview,  in  contrast  to 
situations where other prisoners were present.
Again,  although enthusiasm to participate might be an expected outcome amongst 
inmates  suffering  from  boredom,  perhaps  the extent of keenness  and  the  style  in 
which  this  was  expressed  would  have  been rather different if the  researcher was 
male.
This has implications for clinical work between male inmates and female staff, such 
as Psychologists.  Clearly there may be a number of process issues involving gender, 
attraction and bravado present in such relationships, and these may act as barriers to 
clinical  work  and  might  need  to  be  attended  to  and  overcome  before  any  useful 
clinical  work  can  be  completed.  On  the  contrary,  it  could  be  argued  that  such 
behaviour might be worked with and reflected  back to the inmate and used as an 
opportunity  to  consider  behaviour towards  women  if this  was  an  issue  for them. 
Either way, the impact of relatively young female staff working in a men’s prison 
should be carefully considered.  Perhaps more sessions would be required so as to 
allow time for the novelty of having one-to-one contact with a female to wear off, 
and real clinical work to begin.  It may also be beneficial if sessions took place away 
from the inmate’s location, to bypass the effects of trying to impress fellow inmates 
with ‘success’ with the female staff member.
155With  regards  to  the  sample  used,  although  this  study  included  a  population  of 
offenders who had never been convicted of sexual offences in order to isolate being a 
sex  offender  as  the  independent  variable,  there  was  no  true  control  group  as  all 
participants in the study were incarcerated.  There may be significant effects on self- 
conscious emotions of being cut off from society at large and placed in an institution 
further to  behaviour deemed unacceptable.  For example,  being  incarcerated may 
engender a deep sense of shame, and this may vary depending on amount of time 
already served.  Time did not allow the inclusion of more participants, but the study 
would have been better designed if it included a control group of sex offenders who 
were  living  in  the community.  This  would  have allowed  the exploration  of self- 
conscious emotions in sex offenders without the confound of detention.  A further 
problem  with  the  comparison  group  used  in  this  study  was  that  many  of  these 
participants were remand as opposed to sentenced prisoners.  Therefore a number of 
these  men  may  have  later been judged  to  have  been  innocent  and  released  from 
prison.  Remand  prisoners  may  have  had  rather  different  experiences  of  self- 
conscious  emotions  (for  example,  possibly  lower  levels  of  shame  and  guilt) 
compared to sentenced prisoners or those participants subjected to a hospital order. 
The study as it was would have been improved if all comparison participants were 
sentenced rather than remand prisoners.
This section closes with comments regarding optimal use of data.  An attempt was 
made  to  consider  the  scores  yielded  on  the  BSI  by  participants  in  this  study  in 
relation  to  another  population,  referenced  in  the  BSI  Manual  (Derogatis,  1993). 
However,  norms  were  obtained  from  a  sample  of  American  Adult  Psychiatric
156outpatients.  This  was  not  an  appropriate  sample  with  which  to  consider  scores 
obtained  by  participants  in  the  present  study,  considering  the  likely  differences 
between  samples.  A better sense of how  symptomatic  participants  in  the present 
study  were  would  have  been  obtained  if  they  were  compared  to  a  sample  of 
inpatients,  and  a more  accurate  comparison could have been made  if a  statistical 
procedure, such as an independent samples t-test, would have been performed using 
data from a published study.
Further, offending histories were not recorded in detail.  However it would have been 
interesting  to  have  reviewed  this  data,  in  particular  to  have  gained  a  clearer 
impression of the sex offending sample.  For example, The Massachusetts Treatment 
Centre Rapist Typology  (Version  3,  cited in  Knight, Warren, Reboussin &  Soley, 
[1998]) is a commonly used taxonomy for sexual crimes and includes categories for 
opportunistic rapists controlled by situational factors, such as potential victims being 
present during another antisocial act, e.g. burglary.  Such offenders’ levels of shame 
and other emotions might be quite different to those of sex offenders who originally 
set out to commit a sexual crime.  Additionally, the number of sexual offences ever 
committed  might  have  affected  shame  levels,  with  a  greater  number  of previous 
convictions resulting in higher or possibly even lower shame (the latter effect being a 
possible consequence of practice at justifying such behaviour).  It would have been 
interesting to consider offending history in more detail.
Finally, repertory grids were used in this study as it was thought that more subtlety 
was needed than the rather obvious self-report measures.  Indirect as well as direct 
measures were taken from the grid and this allowed variables such as internal shame
157to  be  measured  without  making  this  obvious  to  participants.  Thus,  another 
dimension of some of the variables was  able to  be considered through the use of 
repertory  grids  in  this  study.  Only  certain  information  was  required  from  the 
repertory grids, however, given the magnitude of the data available from the grids, it 
seems  to some degree wasteful that more data was not analysed from  them.  For 
example, a measure of ambivalence could have been obtained further to examination 
of the nature of the constructs elicited, and content analysis (Landfield, 1971 [cited in 
Winter,  1992])  of elicited  constructs  could  also  have  been  carried  out,  allowing 
classification of constructs (Winter,  1992).  It would have been interesting to have 
explored  whether  sex  offenders  and  non-sex  offenders  differed  in  levels  of 
ambivalence,  or to  have  performed  a content analysis  and  have  assessed  whether 
certain  categories  (such  as  egoism)  were  associated  with  shame  (as  might  be 
predicted  given  the intense  self-focus  of shame).  Overall, there could  have been 
better use of the data in this study.
Systemic issues
The  contrast  of conducting  research  in  two  very different types  of settings,  with 
offenders  who  had  committed  crimes  that  fell  under  the  same  category,  was 
extensive  and  fascinating.  In  the  two  hospitals  that ended  up  being used  in  this 
research, and also in other hospitals where ethical approval had been granted, and the 
administration eventually completed (but too late for these settings to be included in 
the study), a much more rigorous process had to be followed.  The researcher had to 
write  to  and/or  meet Consultant Psychiatrists  to  discuss  the  research  process  and 
measures  in  some  detail,  and  patients  were  very  carefully  hand-picked  as  being 
appropriate  potential  participants.  The  researcher  needed  to  obtain  written  and
158signed  consent  from  Psychiatrists  for  each  individual  being  recommended  to 
participate.  When the researcher entered the wards and asked to meet patients, her 
identity was questioned and checked, and nursing staff inspected documents giving 
permission to ask the patient to participate.  It was also noted that nurses, in general, 
explained to patients that their participation was entirely voluntary,  and would not 
affect their treatment on the ward.  Overall, it seemed that patients were protected by 
staff, and were treated with care and respect.
Conversely, sex offenders and other offenders in prison were treated quite differently 
to this.  When Prison Officers escorted inmates to the interview room, inmates may 
have at times been made to feel as though they had to participate, and that if they did 
not,  this  would  be frowned  upon,  perhaps for not treating the researcher with the 
respect that was evident in the approach that a number of Prison Officers took with 
her.  Once the investigator and inmate were alone, a description of the study was 
given and information about participation being entirely voluntary and unrelated to 
their  treatment  on  the  wing  was  made  explicit.  At  this  point,  a  number  of sex 
offenders in prison made an informed choice to not participate in the study.
This is a slightly worrying prospect, raising issues about how research is conducted 
in prisons, and to what extent inmates perceive and are given the message that they 
have  rights  to  refuse  participation,  and  will  not  resultantly  suffer  negative 
consequences.
It was  also  far less complicated  to be given permission to interview inmates,  and 
actually  make  a  prompt  start  to  data  collection.  There  was  no  Research  &
159Development board for the prison, and ethical approval was obtained in the form of a 
casual email.
These circumstances were antithetical to the rigour and close attention to detail that 
was  endemic  in  the  process  of researching  hospital  patients,  at  the level  of both 
individual treatment of offenders, and administration.  Some aspects of this may be 
considered positive, such as permitting the efficient and time-economical collection 
of data, but in other important ways, such as how inmates may have been made to 
feel about participating, this might have been less desirable and/or ethically sound.
The researcher acted very responsibly under these circumstances and did not use this 
situation  to  her  advantage in  terms  of recruitment of participants;  However,  it  is 
disconcerting to think that provisions were not made at times, to protect inmates’ 
rights and freedom of choice, by prison staff.  Another, possibly less experienced or 
ethically minded researcher, may have responded differently.
In conclusion,  this  paper has  outlined the process of conducting research with  sex 
and non-sex  offenders in hospital  and prison, and has  critically reflected on some 
aspects of the methodology employed in this study.  Contrasts of attitudes towards 
offenders in different settings have also been considered.  Overall, the process was 
fascinating and highlighted various complicated and sensitive matters that can arise 
during the process of conducting such research.
160References
Barker, C., Pistrang, N. & Elliot, R. (2002).  Research methods in clinical 
psychology: An introduction for students and practitioners. Chichester: Wiley.
Boyd, E. & Grant, T. (2005).  Is gender a factor in perceived prison officer 
competence? Male prisoners' perceptions in an English dispersal prison.  Criminal 
Behaviour and Mental Health, 15, 65-74.
Derogatis, L. (1993).  Brief Symptom Inventory: Administration, scoring and 
procedures manual, 3rd edn.  National Computer Systems, Minneapolis, MN.
Fiske, S. & Taylor, S. (1991).  Social Cognition (2nd ed.).  New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hanson, R. & Scott, J. (1995).  Assessing perspective-taking among sexual 
offenders, nonsexual criminals, and nonoffenders.  Sexual Abuse: A journal of 
research and treatment, 7, 259-277.
Holden, R., Kroner, D., Fekken, G. & Popham, S. (1992).  A model of personality 
test item response dissimulation.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
63(22), 272-279.
161Knight, R., Warren, J., Reboussin, R. & Soley, B. (1998). Predicting rapist type from 
crime scene variables.  Criminal Justice and Behaviour,  25, 46-80.
Leahy, M. (1996).  Self-presentation: Impression management and interpersonal 
behaviour.  Colorado: Westview Press.
Popper, K. (1959).  The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Basic Books, 
(original German edition, 1934).
Schaeffer, N. (2000).  Asking questions about threatening topics: A selective 
overview.  In A. Stone, J. Turkkan, C. Bachrach, J. Jobe, H. Kurtzman, and V. Cain 
(Eds.), The science of self-report: Implications for research and practice (pp. 105- 
121).  Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Serin, R. & Mailloux, D. (2003).  Assessment of sex offenders: Lessons learned from 
the assessment of non-sex offenders. Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 
989, 185-97.
Widom, C. (1976).  Interpersonal and personal construct systems in psychopaths. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical  Psychology, 44(4) 614-623.
Winter, D. (1992).  Personal construct psychology in clinical practice.  Routledge: 
London & New York
162APPENDIXAppendix
Figure 5: The Role of Personal Distress in Shame, Guilt and EmpathyFigure 5:  The Role of Personal Distress in Shame, Guilt and Empathy
Relay Station
Transgression
Egoistic Drift
Distressed Other
Personal Distress
Self-oriented
Focus
Global 
Cognitions 
bout the 
Self
Shame
Shame-fused 
Guilt
Barrier
Empathy
GuiltAppendix
Approval / Ethical Approval for the Research to BeginNorthern and Yorkshire Multi-Centre 
Research Ethics Committee
26 October 2004 
Mrs. Abigail San
UCLTrainee Clinical Psychologist 
UCL
Sub-Department of Clinical Health
Psychology
Dear Mrs. San,
Full title of study: Shame and guilt: a pathway to empathy in sex offenders?
REC reference number: 04/MRE03/28 
Protocol number: 2
Thank you for your letter of 11 October 2004, responding to the Committee’s request for 
further information on the above research.
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chairman. 
Confirmation of ethical opinion
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the 
above research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting 
documentation.
The favourable opinion applies to the research sites listed on the attached sheet. 
Conditions of approval
The favourable opinion is given provided that you comply with the conditions set out in the 
attached document.  You are advised to study the conditions carefully.
Approved documents
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows:
Document Type: Application 
Version: 2 
Dated: 11/10/2004 
Date Received: 13/10/2004Document Type: Investigator CV 
Version: N/A Professor David Anthony Winter 
Dated: 17/05/2004 
Date Received: 17/05/2004
Document Type: Investigator CV 
Version: N/A Abigail San 
Dated: 17/05/2004 
Date Received: 17/05/2004
Document Type: Protocol 
Version: 2 
Dated: 11/10/2004 
Date Received: 13/10/2004
Document Type: Covering Letter 
Version: N/A 
Dated: 12/05/2004 
Date Received: 17/05/2004
Document Type: Summary/Synopsis 
Version: 1  
Dated: 05/05/2004 
Date Received: 17/05/2004
Document Type: Peer Review 
Version: N/A memo from Nancy Pistrang 
Dated: 04/12/2003 
Date Received: 17/05/2004
Document Type: Copy of Questionnaire 
Version: N/A Personality Questionnaire (HDHQ)
Dated: 17/05/2004 
Date Received: 17/05/2004
Document Type: Copy of Questionnaire 
Version: N/A IRI Questionnaire 
Dated: 17/05/2004 
Date Received: 17/05/2004
Document Type: Copy of Questionnaire 
Version: N/A ISS Questionnaire 
Dated: 17/05/2004 
Date Received: 17/05/2004
Document Type: Participant Information Sheet
Version: 3
Dated: 20/10/2004
Date Received: 20/10/2004
Document Type: Participant Consent Form
Version: 1
Dated: 05/05/2004
Date Received: 17/05/2004
Document Type: Response to Request for Further Information 
Version: N/ADated: 11/10/2004 
Date Received: 13/10/2004
Document Type: Other 
Version: N/A Repertory Grid 
Dated: 17/05/2004 
Date Received: 17/05/2004
Document Type: Other
Version: N/A Brief Sympton Inventory
Dated: 17/05/2004
Date Received: 17/05/2004
Management approval
If you are the Principal Investigator for the lead site: You should obtain final management 
approval from your host organisation before commencing this research.
The study should not commence at any other site until the local Principal Investigator has 
obtained final management approval from the relevant host organisation.
All researchers and research collaborators who will be participating in the research must 
obtain management approval from the relevant host organisation before commencing any 
research procedures.  Where a substantive contract is not held with the host organisation, it 
may be necessary for an honorary contract to be issued before approval for the research can 
be given.
Statement of compliance (from 1 May 2004)
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating 
Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK.
REC reference number: 04/MRE03/28  Please quote this number on all correspondence
•urs sincerely,
. Northern & Yorkshire MREC
Enclosures  List of names and professions of members who were present at the meeting
and those who submitted written comments
Standard approval conditions
Chairmai
List of approved sitesBarnet, Enfield and Haringey
Mental Health NHS Trust
18 October 2005
Mrs Abigail San 
Dear Mrs San,
Title: The relationship between shame, guilt and empathy in sex 
offenders
REC reference number: 04/M RE03/28
I am pleased to note that you have received the favourable opinion of 
the Research Ethics Committee for your study.
All projects must be registered with the  Research Department if they 
use patients,  staff,  records,  facilities or other resources of the Barnet, 
Enfield and Haringey NHS Mental Health Trust.
The  R&D  Department on behalf of Barnet,  Enfield  and Haringey NHS 
Mental  Health  Trust  is  therefore  able  to  grant  approval  for  your 
research  to  begin,  based  on  your  research  application  and  proposal 
reviewed  by  the  ethics  committee.  Please  note  this  is  subject  to  any 
conditions  set  out  in  their  letter  dated  26  October  2004  &  28  June 
2005.  Should you  fail to  adhere  to these  conditions  or deviate  from 
the  protocol  reviewed  by  the  ethics  committee,  then  this  approval 
would become void.  The  approval is  also  subject to your consent for 
information  to  be  extracted  from  your  project  registration  form  for 
inclusion  in  NHS  project  registration/management  databases  and, 
where appropriate, the National Research Register.
You are obliged to adhere to the research governance framework as set 
out by the Department of Health Research Governance Framework for 
Health and Social Care*.It  is  required  that  all  researchers  submit  a  copy  of their  report  on 
completion  and  details  on  the  progress  of the  study will be  required 
periodically  for  longer  projects.  Copies  of all  publications  emanating 
from the study should also be submitted to the R&D Department.
Furthermore,  all  publications  must  contain  the  following 
acknowledgement.
“This  work  was  undertaken  with,  the  support of Barnet,  Enfield  and 
Haringey  NHS  Mental  Health Trust,  who  received  funding” from  the 
NHS Executive; the views expressed in this publication are those of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the NHS Executive
“a proportion of funding”  where  the research is  also supported by an 
external funding  body;  funding”  where  no external funding  has  been 
obtained.
Best wishes and every success with the study.
Assistant Director R& D
♦Further information on research governance can be obtained on the DH web pages 
at http://www.doh.gov.uk/research/KNEESWORTH  HOUSE
PSYCHIATRIC  HOSPITAL
Ms Abigail San 
Fax (01763) 255718
26 April 2005
Dear Abigail,
Re:  The relationship between shame, guilt and empathy in sex offenders
Many thanks  for  the  amended  information  sheet  for  participants  which  I  have just 
received.
The Research Committee at Kneesworth House Hospital are happy for you to recruit 
participants  from  those  members  of our  patient  population  who  have  a  previous 
conviction for a sex offence.
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you with an up-to-date list of patients convicted of a sexual offence.  She will also be 
pleased to speak with you and facilitate your access to the Hospital.
As a condition of access,  the Hospital asks that you keep us up-to-date on progress 
every six  months.  We would  also  ask that you  supply the Hospital Library with a 
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Name of Consultant
North London Forensic Service 
Camlet Lodge Regional Secure Unit 
12th July 2005
Dear Dr.  ,
Re: Shame, guilt and empathy in sex offenders
I am writing to request your help in identifying patients to participate in the above named 
doctoral thesis research.  I have received approval from Barnet, Enfield and Haringey LREC 
to undertake part of this research at Camlet Lodge.
The research is an investigation into shame, guilt and empathy in sex offenders.  It is 
predicted that high levels of shame will be associated with low levels of empathy, that 
empathy and guilt will be correlated, and that offenders who have not been sexually abused 
themselves will be characterised by greater levels of shame and guilt than those with a history 
of abuse.  Shame will be measured using the Internalised Shame Scale (Cook,  1994) and the 
Other as Shamer Scale (Goss, Gilbert and Allan, 1994).  Guilt we be measured using the guilt 
sub-scale of the Hostility and Direction of Hostility Questionnaire (Caine, Foulds and Hope, 
1967), and empathy will be measured using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980). 
A measure of shame, guilt and empathy will also be obtained using repertory grids.
Inclusion / exclusion criteria:
English-speaking men who have committed at least one sexual offence against an adult or 
child (not necessarily index offence).  Offences can cover the spectrum of  sexual offences, 
ranging  from indecent exposure  to sexual homicide.  The study will not include men 
diagnosed with a learning disability or neurological disorder.
I am based at North London Forensic Service where my supervisor is Sara Henley.  Should 
you recommend any of your patients for participation, I would be grateful if you could return 
the enclosed consent form(s) to me, and discuss it with them at your next meeting.  The 
research is being presented to patients as an investigation into feelings in people who have 
committed offences.I will then arrange to visit them to administer the questionnaires and interview, which will 
take 1-2 hours to complete.  This can be done over two sessions if preferred.  I will explain 
the full consent procedures, and obtain a signed consent form from them.  I will also require 
access to their notes in order to obtain background information.  I assure you that the 
confidentiality of your patients will remain intact at all times.
If you have any patients that you think would be suitable, please could you return the 
enclosed form(s) to me as soon as possible.  If you know of any other suitable patients on 
another consultant’s caseload, I would also be grateful for this information so that I can 
contact them.
Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me 
( ).
Thank you for your time.
Yours sincerely,
Abigail San  Sue Carvalho
Trainee Clinical  Head of North London
Psychologist (UCL)  Forensic Service Psychology
Department
Sara Henley 
Consultant Clinical and 
Forensic Psychologist 
Clinical Manager of 
Specialist ServicesL
Sub-Department of Clinical Health Psychology
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE  LONDON
GOWER STREET  LONDON  WC1E6BT
www.ucl.ac.uk/clinical-health-psychology/
28th July 2006
Dear
Many thanks for your participation last year in my research, which was about some of the 
emotions that different types of offenders experience.  This involved me reading out some 
statements about how you might be feeling, and your reactions to other people.  I also asked 
you to what extent you agreed with those statements.  In addition, you were asked to describe 
yourself and some people that you knew.
I found that there were differences in concern about other peoples’ distress depending on 
what type of offence respondents had committed.  This could mean various different things, 
including that some offenders are more able to tune in to the feelings of others compared to 
other types of offenders.
Looking at all offenders together, I found that those people who experienced a lot of negative 
emotions (for example feeling unimportant compared to others) were also more likely to feel 
distressed when faced with another person who was in some kind of difficulty.  This might 
have been because such people can get a bit distracted by their own feelings when they 
become aware of someone else’s distress.  Similar findings have also been reported in 
different populations, such as students.
Some of the findings in this study were expected, and some were not.  The best thing to do 
would be to repeat the study in a slightly different way and see if the same results emerge. 
Until then, it would be quite difficult to draw any firm conclusions, especially as this was 
quite a new area of research, and one of the things researchers have to do is repeat their 
studies several times to make sure that their results were not found by chance.
Thank you so much for participating and helping to further our understanding of emotions in 
offenders.
Yours sincerely,
Abigail San
Trainee Clinical PsychologistAppendix
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Feelings in people who have committed offences
www.ucl.ac.uk/clinical-health-psychology/
Would you like to take part in a research study?  Before you decide, please think about what it will involve.
Please read this carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if 
you would like to know more.  Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.
We are interested in feelings.  What people think about their offences can make them feel lots of different things. 
We can make treatment better if we know a bit more about how people who have offended think and feel.  We 
are asking for about two hours of your time, where a researcher will ask you questions about your thoughts and 
feelings.  We want to understand how you see things.  We have picked you for the study because we’re 
interviewing other people who have offended in similar ways.  We are hoping to talk to about 56 people 
altogether.
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part  If you decide to, you will be given this Information Sheet to 
keep.  You will also be asked to sign a form that says you agree to be part of the study.  We may wish to look at 
your medical records to find out a bit more.  If you say you’ll take part you will also be allowing us to read your 
medical notes, which will be kept strictly confidential.  You can stop the interview at any time without saying why. 
This won't affect your treatment.  If you do or don't participate, you will still get the same treatment.
There will be either one or two interviews- it’s up to you if you want to do it all in one day, or on two different 
days.  After this, you won't be asked to do anything else.  If you need to travel to a clinic especially for the 
research, we will pay back your travel expenses.
We  really  don't  think  you  will  be  harmed  at  all  by  taking  part  in  this  project,  and  there  are  no  special 
compensation arrangements.  If you want to complain, or if you’re not happy about how you've been treated 
whilst being part of this study, the normal National Health Service complaints procedures will be available.
All information known about you will be kept strictly confidential, but if anything you say suggests that someone 
might be in danger, a senior member of staff will be told straight away.  Your name and address won't be written 
on anything outside the hospital/surgery.
The results of the study will be published in a journal, and a copy of the report will also be given to staff in this 
unit.  Anybody who takes part will be sent something in the post explaining what we found.  No names will be 
used in any report.
The research is being organised and paid for by University College London.  The Central Office for Research 
Ethics Committee are happy for the research to be done.
If you want to know anything else, please contact Abigail San, Trainee Clinical Psychologist at the Sub- 
Department of Clinical Health Psychology, University College London, 
Please keep this Information sheet.  Thank you for reading this, and for taking part in the study (if you decide to).
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UNIVERSITY COLLEGE  LONDON
GOWER STREET  LONDON  WC1E6BT
Centre Number:  :
Study Number:
Patient Identification Number for this trial:
CONSENT FORM
Title of Project:  Emotions in people who have committed offences
Name of Researcher:  Abigail San
Please initial box
1.  I confirm that 1 have read and understand the information sheet dated........................
(version  ) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.  Q
2.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time,
without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected.  □
3.  I understand that sections of any of my medical notes may be looked at by a responsible
individual from UCL.  I give permission for this individual to have access to my records.  []
4.  I agree to take part in the above study.  Q
Name of Patient  Date  Signature
Name of Person taking consent  Date  Signature
(if different from researcher)
Researcher  Date  Signature
1  for patient;  1 for researcher;  1 to be kept with hospital notesAppendix
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Myself before ever having committed a sexual offence 
Myself just after having committed any sexual offences 
How I would like to be 
Myself now
How others think I should be
____________ Someone I sexually offended against
___________ A person I liked
___________ A person I disliked
My mother (or mother figure)
My father (or father figure)
___________ Brother or sister nearest my age (or person most like a sibling)
The sort of person who would commit a sexual offence 
The sort of person who would not commit a sexual offence
>  Add shame, guilt, empathy
SHAME -  feeling that other people judge you negatively
GUILT -  judging your own behaviour negatively
EMPATHY -  being able to really understand how someone else feelsRepertory Grid C
A.  Myself before ever having committed my last offence
B.  Myself just after having committed my last offence
C.  How I would like to be
D.  Myself now
E.  How others think I should be
F.  ___________ Someone I offended against
G.  ____________A person I liked
H.  ___________ A person I disliked
I.  My mother (or mother figure)
J.  My father (or father figure)
K.  ___________ Brother or sister nearest my age (or person most like a sibling)
L.  The sort of person who would commit an offence like mine 
M. The sort of person who would not commit an offence like mine
>  Add shame, guilt, empathy
SHAME -  feeling that other people judge you negatively
GUILT -  judging your own behaviour negatively
EMPATHY -  being able to really understand how someone else feels
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